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COMMENT
WITHHOLDING TREATMENT FROM SERIOUSLY ILL
AND HANDICAPPED INFANTS: WHO SHOULD
MAKE THE DECISION AND HOW?-AN
ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
In recent decades, scientific and technological advances in neonatology'
have dramatically increased survival possibilities2 for critically ill infants, in-
cluding premature infants3 and infants born with congenital defects.' As a
I. Neonatology is defined as "[t]he study of disorders of the newborn." T. STEDMAN,
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 927 (4th unabr. lawyer's ed. 1976). In the past 17 years,
neonatology has become a major subspecialty in pediatric care. Physicians who specialize in
the care of newborns are generally referred to as "neonatologists." G. AVERY, NEONATOLOGY
PATHOPHYSIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF THE NEWBORN xix (2d ed. 1981). The major scientific
and technological advances that have contributed to the development of the subspecialty are:
increased knowledge of pathophysiologic mechanisms of disease in the newborn infant which
produced development of therapies to treat infant diseases; development of machinery to monitor
the infant's vital signs and biochemical status; and development of mechanical respirators designed
exclusively for the newborn. Id. at 8, 20, 424. For a discussion of the history of neonatology,
see generally id. at 3-11 (tracing the history of the care of the infant from the 1890's to the present).
2. Statistical studies reveal that between 1930 and 1970, the death rate for infants during
the first 28 days of life declined by an average of 11.40o every 10 years. In contrast, for the
10 years between 1970 and 1980, the death rate for infants declined by 2407o. President's Com-
mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Deciding to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment, Ethical, Medical, and Legal Issues in Treatment
Decisions 197 n. I (Mar. 1983) [hereinafter cited as President's Commission].
3. The length of a normal pregnancy is 40 weeks. Premature infants are described as in-
fants born prior to the 38th week of pregnancy. G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 25, 230-61. Mor-
tality rates for premature infants depend upon the degree of prematurity. Generally, the more
premature the infant, the higher the mortality rate. Due to increased medical knowledge and
advances in technology between 1970 and 1980, however, the mortality rates for premature
infants have dropped significantly. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 197; see also G.
AVERY, supra note I, at 230-61 (discussion of the problems of premature infants and survival
rates for premature infants).
4. "Congenital defects" is a broad term encompassing a wide variety of conditions. Defects
include genetic defects in the development of the neurologic system, and severe perinatal trauma.
The most frequent genetic defects are Down's Syndrome, Trisomy 18, and Trisomy 13. Down's
Syndrome (Trisomy 21) is a chromosomal syndrome characterized by the presence of 47 rather
than 46 chromosomes and moderate mental retardation. G. AVERY, supra note I, at 872. In-
fants with Down's Syndrome often have an associated congenital heart defect and/or associated
intestinal obstruction. Id. at 812, 880. Trisomy 18 is a chromosomal syndrome characterized
by the presence of an extra chromosome 18 and mental retardation. Id. at 883. Infants with
Trisomy 18 often have an associated cleft palate, congenital heart disease, and gastrointestinal
tract and renal abnormalities. Early death is common. Id. Trisomy 13 is a chromosomal syn-
drome characterized by the presence of an extra chromosome 13 and marked mental and motor
retardation. Id. Infants with Trisomy 13 usually have congenital heart disease and associated
gastrointestinal tract and renal malformations. Id. Early death is common. J. GOODWIN, J.
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result of these advances, the medical decision-making process concerning the
appropriate medical care for such infants has become increasingly complex.
It is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to predict whether treatment' will
save these infants, merely prolong dying, or create serious impairments."
Deciding whether to treat an infant whose chances for survival are precarious
and for whom hopes of a normal life seem limited presents not only a medical
challenge, but also an agonizing dilemma for the parents.' The question of
whether treatment should be rendered or withheld has increasingly become
an integral part of the medical decision-making process.'
GODDEN, & G. CHANCE, PERINATAL MEDICINE, Tim BASIC SCIENCE UNDERLYING CLINICAL PRAC-
TICE 37 (1976).
The most common defects in the development of the neurologic system are anencephaly,
meningomyelocele (spina bifida), and hydrocephaly. Anencephaly is a disorder in which the
brain fails to develop fully and skull bones are generally absent, leaving the brain and spinal
cord fully exposed. G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 944-45, 979. Anencephalic infants usually die
within the first days of life. Id. at 945. In meningomyelocele, the neural tube fails to close
during fetal development, resulting in exposure and poor development of that portion of the
spinal cord and nerves. Id. at 945, 981. Infants with meningomyelocele have varying degrees
of bowel, bladder, and lower extremity paralysis, and often have an associated hydrocephaly.
Id. at 981. Their mental function is often impaired. Id. at 982. Hydrocephaly is a disorder
in which the flow of spinal fluid is obstructed, resulting in an accumulation of spinal fluid
in the ventricles of the brain. Id. at 965. Surgery is required to relieve the accumulation. Vary-
ing degrees of mental retardation can result from continued pressure on the brain. Id. at 965-68.
Severe perinatal trauma refers to interruption of blood flow from the mother to the infant
during the process of labor and delivery, causing the infant to suffer brain damage from lack
of oxygen. Id. at 184-85. The extent of the damage depends upon how long the blood supply
was interrupted. Id. at 185. For a thorough discussion of congenital defects, see G. AVERY,
supra note 1, at 870-89. See also Ellis, Letting Defective Babies Die: Who Decides?, 7 AM.
J.L. & MED. 393, 395-98 (1982) (describing what is meant by severely defective newborns);
Mueller & Phoenix, A Dilemma for the Legal and Medical Professions: Euthanasia and the
Defective Newborn, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501, 501 (1978) (discussion of major infant defects);
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv.
213, 213-15 (1975) (discussion of infant defects) [hereinafter cited as Robertson, Involuntary
Euthanasia]; Note, Birth Defective Infants: A Standard for Non-Treatment, 30 STAN. L. REv.
599, 599 nn.3-5 (1978) (discussion of infant defects) [hereinafter cited as Note, Birth Defective
Infants].
5. Treatment is a broad term which can encompass all forms of medical therapy-provision
of nutrition, medications, blood transfusions, use of mechanical respirators, and surgery-used
to treat a seriously ill infant. For the most thorough treatise describing the treatment required
for various forms of newborn illnesses, see generally 0. AVERY, supra note 1.
6. For example, in some cases the prolonged use of mechanical respirators to treat lung
disorders can cause permanent lung damage. See G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 398-405. The
use of oxygen may cause blindness. Id. at 1135.
7. See President's Commission, supra note 2, at 198. One commentator has described the
dilemma as two-sided:
[O]vertreatment may be as harmful and may violate the infant's interests as much
as undertreatment. The dilemma is to decide whether a particular child ought to
be treated-that is, whether treatment is owed because life, from the child's perspec-
tive, is a good, or whether nontreatment is required because survival may be
reasonably viewed as not advancing his or her interests.
Robertson, Dilemma in Danville, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 6 (Oct. 1981).
8. See President's Commission, supra note 2, at 198.
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Traditionally, decisions of whether or not to treat critically ill infants have
been made within the privacy of the parent-physician relationship. 9 Most
cases presented limited, if any, options for treatment."° As possibilities for
treatment expanded, however, the medical decision-making process came
under increased scrutiny. Consequently, concerned individuals attempted to
define the parameters of acceptable medical decisions." Despite several at-
tempts at definition, the parameters remain undefined largely because each
new medical development creates new questions. Analysis of decisions,
therefore, must be made on a case-by-case basis.
9. There are a limited number of cases in which the court has examined a decision to
withhold treatment from a seriously ill newborn. See infra note 119.
10. See Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia, supra note 4, at 214; Note, Birth Defective
Infants, supra note 4, at 599-600.
11. A widely publicized study indicated that 43 out of 299 deaths in a neonatal intensive
care nursery resulted from decisions to withhold treatment. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical
Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, 289 NEw ENG. J. MED. 890, 890 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Duff & Campbell]. The decisions to withhold treatment followed deliberations in which
"parents and physicians . . .concluded that prognosis for meaningful life was extremely poor
or hopeless." Id. The physicians later argued strongly that such decisions should be left to
parents and physicians:
We believe the burdens of decision making must be borne by families and their
professional advisers because they are most familiar with the respective situations.
Since families primarily must live with and are most affected by the decisions, it
therefore appears that society and the health professions should provide only general
guidelines for decision making. Moreover, since variations between situations are
so great, and the situations themselves are so complex, it follows that much latitude
in decision making should be expected and tolerated.
Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special Care Nursery, in DEATH, DYING,
AND EuTHANASIA 91, 100 (D. Horan & D. Mall eds. 1977). Publication of the Duff and Camp-
bell article prompted a Senate Committee Hearing. See Medical Ethics: The Right to Survival,
1974: Hearing on the Examination of Moral and Ethical Problems Faced with the Agonizing
Decision of Life and Death Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 93d Cong.; 2d Sess. 26 (1974). A number of physicians testified before
the committee concerning the practice of withholding treatment and were not in agreement
with respect to whether physicians, parents, or third parties should make the decision to withhold
treatment. Id. at 1-32. Following this hearing, the federal government did not attempt to apply
federal regulations to decisions concerning the withholding of treatment. The seminal article
which attempts to define the legal parameters of the decision to withhold treatment from seriously
ill newborns was written by Professor John A. Robertson, who described the practice of
withholding treatment as "involuntary euthanasia" which he defined as:
the absence of consent of the person from whom treatment is withheld, as opposed
to "voluntary euthanasia," where the subject gives full, knowing consent to another
person's causing his death. . . .Involuntary euthanasia is passive and indirect, as
Where care or sustenance is withheld; voluntary euthanasia is active and direct as
where the act that causes death is actually performed rather than omitted.
Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia, supra note 4, at 214-15 n.16. Professor Robertson's arti-
cle explored the criminal and civil liability of parents and physicians who made decisions to
withhold treatment from seriously ill infants. Id.; accord Ellis, supra note 4; Foreman, The
Physician's Criminal Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 54 (1975);
Horan, Euthanasia, Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child: Death as a Treatment of
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It is clear that parents' 2 have the primary authority and responsibility to
make decisions regarding medical care for their infants.' 3 Outside interven-
tion is permitted only when parents appear to fail in their duty to their
infants." In these instances, the state may seek to override a parental deci-
sion by demonstrating that- the circumstances warrant state intervention.'"
Although the standards for determining whether state intervention is ap-
propriate vary according to the facts involved in each decision, the courts
have given fair consideration to the parental decision.' 6
Recently, the federal government intensified scrutiny of decisions regard-
ing treatment of critically ill infants. In response to what the federal govern-
ment perceived as a discriminatory decision to withhold medical care from
an Indiana infant on the basis of the infant's handicap,' 7 the Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has attempted to apply federal regula-
tions to decisions regarding the medical care of handicapped infants.' 8 Pur-
suant to its rulemaking authority granted under section 504 of the Rehabilita-
Choice, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 76 (1975); Mueller & Phoenix, supra note 4; Note, Birth Defective
Infants, supra note 4. For an article discussing euthanasia generally, see Note, Euthanasia:
Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAmaB LAw. 1202 (1973).
More recently, commentators have begun to explore the theological aspects of a nontreatment
decision. See Paris, Terminating Treatment of Newborns: A Theological Perspective, 10 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 120 (1982).
12. For purposes of this article, the term "parents" refers only to biological parents because
decisions to withhold treatment from seriously ill infants are generally made by biological parents.
The decision to withhold treatment is often made within hours of the infant's birth-long before
an infant would be placed in the custody of adoptive parents or the state.
13. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
15. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
17. Following the death of Infant Doe in April 1982, see infra notes 23-38 and accompany-
ing text, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) issued a notice to health
care providers in the nation's hospitals which stated in part: "There has recently been heightened
public concern about the adequacy of medical treatment of newborn infants with birth defects.
Reports suggest that operable defects have sometimes not been treated, and instead infants
have been allowed to die, because of the existence of a concurrent handicap, such as Down's
Syndrome." Discrimination Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourish-
ment; Notice to Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982).
18. Interim Final Rule, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 48 Fed. Reg. 9630
(1983), invalidated in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C.
1983) [hereinafter cited as Interim Final Rule]; Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap
Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 48 Fed. Reg. 30,846 (1983) (to be codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 84.61(b)-.61(e)) (proposed July 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Health Care for
Handicapped Infants]. For a full discussion of the regulations proposed by the DHHS, see
infra notes 52-83 and accompanying text. Currently, the term "critically ill infant" refers to
all infants who are critically ill regardless of the infant's underlying medical problems. As a
result of federal regulation, however, there will now be two terms to describe critically ill in-
fants: "critically ill nonhandicapped infants" and "critically ill handicapped infants." See in-
fra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
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tion Act of 1973,'1 the DHHS issued proposed regulations" which provide
for the withdrawal of funding from federally financed hospitals if care is
withheld from handicapped infants." Through the implementation of these
regulations, the DHHS is seeking to ensure that appropriate treatment is
delivered to handicapped infants.2
This Comment will discuss the events that prompted promulgation of the
proposed rules and the current standards for analyzing parental decisions
regarding medical care for their infants. Further, this Comment will suggest
that the rules promulgated by the DHHS pursuant to section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, authorizing federal intervention in the decision-
making process, have created a distinction between handicapped and non-
handicapped infants which is of questionable legal and medical validity. First,
this distinction alters the manner in which the physician makes the initial
medical decision. Second, this distinction forces courts to establish a new
-standard to resolve medical decision-making conflicts when the infant is
handicapped. As a result of these two changes, the constitutionally protected
rights of parents to participate in the medical decision-making process are
effectively eliminated. Finally, this distinction generates significant defini-
tional problems and promotes uncertainty in determining when the rules are
applicable. After examining the rules and their impact, an alternative is sug-
gested which protects parental participation in the decision-making process
and ensures that all infants will receive appropriate treatment.
I. THE FACTS OF THE INFANT DoE CASE
In April 1982, Infant Doe was born at Bloomington Hospital in Bloom-
ington, Indiana.23 Shortly after Infant Doe's birth, it became apparent that
19. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973). As originally enacted, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
provided:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
section 706(6) of this title shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Id. Relying on the plain language of the Act, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) did not promulgate any regulations to implement § 504. In a suit against HEW, however,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that Congress intended for
implementing regulations to be issued and ordered HEW to issue regulations. See Cherry v.
Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). Congress subsequently amended § 504 in 1978
to include rulemaking authority. Section 119, Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and
Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1981)). Implementing regulations are cur-
rently embodied in 45 C.F.R. § 84 (1983).
20. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18.
21. Id. at 30,851.
22. Id. at 30,846.
23. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-00 (Cir. Ct. Monroe County, Ind. Apr. 12, 1982),
writ of mandamus dismissed sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S 140 (Ind.
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he had Down's Syndrome," esophageal atresia with an associated
tracheoesophageal fistula (TEF), 5 and a possible aortic coarctation. 2' The
presence of the esophageal atresia and TEF precluded oral feedings because
whatever the infant ingested would be taken into his lungs, causing the in-
fant to suffocate.2 7 In order for the infant to survive, surgery was needed
to correct the defects. " The Does' obstetrician consulted with two obstetri-
cians and three pediatricians to determine the proper course of treatment."
The three pediatricians recommended that the infant be transferred to Riley
Children's Hospital in Indianapolis for corrective surgery. 0 The three obstetri-
cians recommended that the infant remain at Bloomington Hospital and be
allowed to die." Confronted with these options, the Does- decided to forego
treatment and allow the infant to die.
32
The Does' decision generated a storm of controversy and national media
exposure. 3 Within twenty-four hours of the decision, the matter was before
Sup. Ct. May 27, 1982) (case moot by infant's death), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983),
reprinted in Margaret M. Heckler, To Be Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services-
Additional Consideration: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 73-76 (1983) [hereinafter cited as In re Infant Doe].
24. See supra note 4.
25. See G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 798-99. The esophagus is the passage from the mouth
to the stomach. Esophageal atresia is a congenital defect in which the upper esophagus ends
in a blind pouch. In 90% of the infants who have esophageal atresia, there is an associated
TEF. TEF is a congenital defect where the upper portion of the lower esophagus connects
with the trachea (the air passage from mouth to lungs) rather than with the upper esophagus.
In 20% of the infants born with these defects, there is an associated congenital heart defect. Id.
26. See id. at 458. The aorta is a major blood vessel which supplies blood from the left
ventricle of the heart to the blood circulation system of the body. Coarctation of the aorta
is a congenital heart defect in which the aorta is poorly developed, resulting in a narrowing
of the aorta in varying degrees. There are often other heart defects associated with coarctation
of the aorta. Id.
There are two types of coarctation of the aorta: simple and complex. In infants with simple
coarctation who respond to medical therapy, corrective surgery may be delayed until childhood.
Id. at 458-59. Over 95% of the infants born with simple coarctation survive past the first
year. Id. Infants born with complex coarctation, however, require surgery within the first weeks
of life. Id. at 460. The survival rate with surgery is 500. Further, survivors require close medical
attention throughout life and may require additional surgery. Id.
27. In re Infant Doe, supra note 23, at 73; see supra note 25.
28. In re Infant Doe, supra note 23, at 74. Corrective surgery may be performed immediately
if the infant's condition permits, or may be performed in stages. See G. AVERY, supra note
1, at 801-03. Surgery is curative in about 850 of infants who have esophageal atresia with
TEF. Id. at 803.
29. In re Infant Doe, supra note 23, at 74.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.; see Pless, The Story of Baby Doe, 309 NEw ENO. J. MED. 664 (1983). The medical
records of Infant Doe were sealed by the court to protect the anonymity of the parents. Therefore,
the medical facts of the Infant Doe case were not publicly known until September 1983 when
Dr. Pless made them public in the New England Journal of Medicine. The Does made their
decision based upon the diagnosis stated in the text. Autopsy results revealed, however, that
Infant Doe had Down's Syndrome with a reparable esophageal atresia and TEF. The aorta
was normal. Id. at 664.
33. In re Infant Doe, supra note 23, at 73-76; see Pless, supra note 32, at 664. The infant
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the Indiana courts.34 The issue, as framed by the court's declaratory judg-
ment, was "[Whether] Mr. and Mrs. Doe, as natural parents of Infant Doe,
have the right, after having been fully informed of the consequences, to
determine the appropriate course of treatment for their minor child?"" The
court answered in the affirmative and ordered the hospital to follow the
Does' decision.3" After the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the decision,"
Bloomington prosecutors sought an emergency stay of the Indiana Court
Orders from the United States Supreme Court. The infant died, however,
before the prosecutors could reach Washington.3
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In the month following Infant Doe's death, President Ronald Reagan sent
a memorandum to Richard Schweiker, then Secretary of the DHHS, which
ensured continuing national attention to the case and ignited the current
controversy. 9 The memorandum directed Schweiker to notify the nation's
health care providers that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Act) '
protects all handicapped individuals, '4 1 including infants.' 2 Schweiker issued
was given medication for pain and restlessness. The Does visited and held their infant frequently
until his death six days later.
34. See Baby Dies Before Court Could Be Asked to Save It, Boston Globe, Apr. 16, 1982,
at 5, col. 1, cited in Shapiro, Statute, Medical Treatment of Defective Newborns, An Answer
to the "Baby Doe" Dilemma, 20 HARv. J. ON LEoss. 137, 148 (1983); Evansville Couple Races
the Clock, Law to Save "Condemned Baby", Evansville Courier, Apr. 15, 1982, at 1, cited
in Strong, Defective Infants and Their Impact on Families: Ethical and Legal Considerations,
11 L. MEn. & HEALTH CARE 168, 168 n.6 (1983); Waco Tribune Herald, Apr. 22, 1982, at
5A, cited in Note, The Legacy of Infant Doe, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 699, 699 n.3 (1983); Washington
Post, Apr. 16, 1982, at A.16, col. 1, cited in Note, Defective Newborns: Inconsistent Applica-
tion of Legal Principles Emphasized by the Infant Doe Case, 14 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 569,
570 n.10 (1983); CBS Evening News (May 18, 1982); Mac-Neil Lehrer Report, Saving Newborns
(Transcript 1738 May 18, 1982).
35. In re Infant Doe, supra note 23, at 75.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.; see Weir, The Government and Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Infants,
309 NEw ENGo. J. MED. 661, 661 (1983).
39. Weir, supra note 38, at 661.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his
handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ...
Id. The purpose of the Act is "to develop and implement, through research, training and ser-
vices, and the guarantee of equal opportunity comprehensive and coordinated programs of voca-
tional rehabilitation and independent living." Id. § 701.
41. As defined in the Act, a handicapped individual is "any person who (i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such a person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impair-
ment." Id. § 706(7)(B).
42. M. SmiTH, HANDICAPPED NEwaoRNs: CURRENT ISSUES AND LEOISLATION, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, July 28, 1982, cited in Weir, supra note 38, at 661 n.1l.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
a general statement notifying health care providers that federal law prohibits
medical discrimination against handicapped infants.4 3 On the same day, the
DHHS office for Civil Rights issued a written notice to the administrators
of the nation's 6,400 hospitals." The notice referred to the event in Bloom-
ington, recited the terms of section 504, and set forth an interpretation of
the passage as it applied to infants. 5 The notice further advised that health
care providers would violate section 504 if they facilitated a decision to
withhold treatment from an infant because the infant was handicapped."
Finally, the notice indicated that noncompliance with the requirements of
section 504 could result in the termination of federal financial assistance.4 7
The DHHS notice generated swift and divergent reactions. Medical
organizations opposed federal intervention. 8 The president of the National
Right to Life Committee supported the action. 9 An Indiana Supreme Court
43. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HHS NEws (May 18, 1982).
Schweiker stated:
In the aftermath of the recent death of a handicapped newborn child in Bloom-
ington, Indiana, there has been a great deal of justified public concern about the
protection of newborn infants with birth defects and their right as human beings
to receive appropriate medical treatment. President Reagan and I share this con-
cern, and the President has instructed me to make absolutely clear to health care
providers in this nation that federal law does not allow medical discrimination against
handicapped infants.
Id.
44. Discriminating Against the Handicapped by Withholding Treatment or Nourishment,
Notice to Health Care Providers, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (June 16, 1982).
45. Id. The notice indicated that under § 504, it is unlawful for a recipient of federal fund-
ing to withhold nutritional sustenance or medical or surgical treatment to correct a life-
threatening condition from a handicapped infant if: "(1) the withholding is based on the fact
that the infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutri-
tional sustenance medically contraindicated." Id.
46. Id. The notice indicated that neither counseling parents to withhold treatment because
an infant is handicapped nor allowing an infant from whom treatment has been withheld to
remain in the hospital would constitute facilitation of discriminatory conduct. The notice further
indicated that hospitals would be responsible for any discriminatory conduct of physicians. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Weir, supra note 38, at 663. The American Hospital Association issued a formal
statement promising to make every effort to avoid federal regulation, denying that hospitals
had been guilty of facilitating discrimination and denouncing the notice as a "simplistic solu-
tion" to a complex situation. Id. The American Academy of Pediatrics stated:
[T]he effort . . . to solve this complex problem through strict interpretation and
enforcement of the letter of section 504 may have the unintended effect of requir-
ing treatment that is not in the best interest of handicapped children. Handicapped
persons ... need health care providers who will carefully examine the appropriateness
of specific medical intervention. . . . It will frequently be the case that the use
of a specific technology or procedures will not be in the best interest of the
handicapped person. Withholding a medical treatment will frequently be both legally
and ethically justified in our efforts to do what is right for these patients.
Id. (emphasis in original).
49. Id. J.C. Willke, M.D., president of the National Right to Life Committee, stated:
Fatal discrimination against Down's syndrome and other handicapped infants has
been increasing for years in this country. This discrimination consists of denial of
[Vol. 33:495
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justice felt that the notice was unnecessary." One hospital administrator
stated, "We take it for what it is-a non-binding opinion." 5'
Ten months later, the DHHS took another step to implement the presi-
dent's directive. On March 7, 1983, pursuant to rule-making authority granted
under section 504,2 the DHHS published an interim final rule in the Federal
Register." The rule was to become effective on March 22, 1983.1 The pur-
pose of the rule was to create mechanisms for timely investigation and im-
mediate enforcement action, when necessary, to protect a handicapped in-
fant whose life might be endangered by a discriminatory decision to withhold
treatment." To achieve the rule's purpose, the DHHS provided for three
procedural modifications of section 504 implementing regulations." The first
modification created a notice requirement."' Specifically, health care pro-
viders were required to post a notice describing the federal regulation in
a conspicuous place in each hospital area responsible for delivery of care
to infants. 8 The second modification provided the DHHS with authority
to take immediate action to protect infants.9 The third modification pro-
vided the DHHS with twenty-four hour access to hospitals and hospital
records to conduct investigations.60
medical treatment, even food and water, which would be routinely provided to
non-handicapped infants. The ethic which promotes infanticide is related to the
elitist "quality of life" argument used to justify abortion-on demand.
Id.
50. Id. Richard Given, Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, stated: "There's no
need for any legislation .... We can't legislate miracles. We can't pass a law saying doctors
have to save every child that's born." Id.
51. Id.
52. See supra note 19.
53. See Interim Final Rule, supra note 18.
54. Id. at 9630.
55. Id.
56. Id. The implementing regulations of § 504 are currently embodied in 45 C.F.R. § 84
(1983).
57. Interim Final Rule, supra note 18, at 9630.
58. Id. at 9631. The notice specified that: "DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED AND
CARE FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS IS . . . PROHIBITED BY FEDERAL LAW.
... Any person having knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discriminatorily denied
food or customary medical care should contact ... [DHHS]." Id. (emphasis in original).
The notice was to be 8" x 14" and displayed conspicuously in each delivery, maternity, and
pediatric ward and each nursery, including each intensive care nursery. Id.
59. Id. at 9630, 9632. Existing regulations require a 10-day waiting period between the time
the DHHS notifies a recipient of its failure to comply and the time the DHHS makes a referral
to the Department of Justice, or takes other legal action to obtain compliance. 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.8(d)(3) (1983). The Interim Final Rule created a narrow exception to the 10-day waiting
period when, in the judgment of the DHHS officials, immediate remedial action would be
necessary to protect the life of a handicapped individual.
60. Interim Final Rule, supra note 18, at 9632. Regulations existing at the time limited
the DHHS's access to facilities and information pertinent to ascertaining compliance with
§ 504 to normal business hours. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) (1981). The interim rule provided the DHHS
with 24 hour access to facilities and pertinent information when, in the judgment of the DHHS
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Once again, DHHS action generated divergent reactions and attracted media
attention.6 ' On March 18, 1983, four days before the rule was to become
effective, the American Academy of Pediatrics filed suit against the Secretary
of the DHHS to enjoin the Interim Final Rule. 2 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia denied a temporary restraining order,
but granted expedited review.63 On April 8, 1983, the court heard arguments
and six days later held the rule invalid as violating the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).64
officials, immediate access was necessary to protect the life or health of a handicapped infant.
Interim Final Rule, supra note 18, at 9630.
Members of the DHHS team and a "Regional Baby Doe Coordinator" were to be prepared
to travel to a hopsital site within 24 hours of the receipt of a complaint on the hotline. Plain-
tiff's Points and Authorities in Support of Declaratory and Permanent Injunctive Relief at
4, American Academy of Pediactrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). Squad members
would be provided with copies of the "Baby Doe" complaint investigation procedures. Id.
If the team leader determined through preliminary on-site interviews that an infant was in "im-
minent danger," the procedures required the team leader to "immediately negotiate with the
hospital to provide the required treatment." Id. In order to prepare to seek injunctive relief
in federal district court, the procedures indicated that the team leader must initiate further
interviews with "the parents, physicians, nurses (delivery room, operating room, recovery room,
nursery), and '[a]ny witnesses to delivery or any other aspect of the birth (e.g., aides, students,
interns, residents, orderlies, technicians).' " Id.
61. See, e.g., Tifft, Debate on the Boundary of Life, TIME MAG., Apr. 11, 1983, at 68,
69 (discussing the rules and describing the varied reactions of physicians, pro-life groups and
President's Commission).
62. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). The
National Association of Children's Hospital and Related Institutions and Children's Hospital
National Medical Center joined the American Academy of Pediatrics in bringing the suit. Id.
63. Id. at 396.
64. Id. at 403-04. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982),
provides that the action of "each authority of the Government of the United States," which
includes the DHHS, is subject to judicial review. Id. § 701(b)(1). Judicial review is precluded
only where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where "agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law." Id. § 701(a); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 contains no prohibi-
tion on judicial review of agency action. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Further, DHHS action under
§ 504 does not qualify for an exemption as an action that is committed to agency discretion
by law. That narrow exception applies only where statutes are drawn so broadly that, in a
given case, there is no law to apply. See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410 (describing the
parameters of the "agency discretion" exception).
Section 706 of the APA defines the scope of review of agency actions. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
Section 706 provides that a reviewing court "shall decide all relevant questions of law, inter-
pret constitutional and statutory provisions and determine the meaning or applicability of the
terms of an agency action." Id. Further, § 706(2) provides a reviewing court with the authority
to hold unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions that fail to meet the
six standards of § 706(2). These standards require the court to set aside agency action if the
court finds the action to be:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of a statutory
right;
1984] WITHHOLDING TREATMENT FROM INFANTS 505
First, the court invalidated the rule as an arbitrary and capricious agency
action prohibited by section 706(2)(A) of the APA." In reaching this con-
clusion, the court questioned the underlying factual basis used to justify the
regulatory action.66 Further, the court found that the Secretary had given
insufficient consideration to relevant factors which should have been con-
sidered prior to the creation of a hotline and other mechanisms for immediate
investigations in the health care setting. 67 Finally, the court ruled that the
text of the rule failed to define adequately what would constitute a viola-
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557
of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing required
by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
Id. § 1706(2); see Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413-14. See generally K. DAVis, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TEXT 508-24 (3d ed. 1972) (describing circumstances in which agency actions are reviewable).
65. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 399. The text of § 706(2)(A) outlines a narrow standard of
review. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. To make a finding that an agency action fails to meet
§ 706(2)(A), a reviewing court must consider whether the agency action was based upon con-
sideration of relevant factors and whether the action represented a clear error in judgment.
Id. The inquiry into the facts underlying an agency decision to act must be "searching and
careful." Id. A reviewing court, however, "is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency," if there is a rational basis for the agency's action. Id.; see Heckler, 561
F. Supp. at 399.
66. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 400. In the court's opinion, the record failed to suggest a
"widespread denial of proper newborn care such as would justify the type of regulation selected."
Id. The evidence demonstrated that the underlying factual bases used to support the regulation
were: a sensationalized television documentary entitled "Death in the Nursery," which review-
ed past publicized cases where medical treatment had been withheld from infants with birth
defects; newspaper accounts of those cases; a Mac-Neil Lehrer broadcast; some medical surveys
conducted in the 1970's which showed disparate practices in withholding of treatment; and
investigations conducted during the period the rule was operative which failed to reveal any
evidence of impropriety. Id. at 399.
67. Id. at 399-400. First, the Secretary failed to consider the disruptive effects of a "hotline"
upon the ongoing treatment of newborns. The court noted:
fAlny anonymous tipster, for whatever personal motive, can trigger an [intrusive]
investigation. . . . In a desperate situation where medical decisions must be made
on short notice by physicians, hospital personnel and often distraught parents, the
sudden descent of "Baby Doe" stands on the scene, monopolizing physician and
nurse time and making hospital charts and records unavailable during treatment,
can hardly be presumed to produce higher quality care for the infant.
Id. at 399 (emphasis added). Second, the Secretary failed to consider that an infant's interest
may not be served by a rule which contemplates removal of the infant from the hospital and
termination of federal assistance to an entire hospital because parents refuse medical care
for their infant. Id. Third, the Secretary failed to give consideration to the "advantages and
disadvantages of relying on the wishes of parents who, knowing the setting in which the child
may be, in many ways are in the best position to evaluate the infant's best interests." Id.
at 400. Fourth, no attempt was made to determine whether treatment would be appropriate
for a terminally ill infant. Id. Finally, the funding of the extensive care mandated by the regulation
and the allocation of medical resources among newborns were also not considered by the
Secretary. Id.
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tion, and thus, the rule was "virtually without meaning beyond its intrinsic
in terrorem effect.''63
Second, the court relied on the rulemaking requirements of section 553
of the APA as another ground for invalidating the rule.69 Section 553 pro-
hibits rulemaking without benefit of a notice and comment period, especially
when a rule will affect a large number of people or change established
practices." Section 553 further provides for a thirty-day delay between the
promulgation of a rule and its effective date.7 The Secretary, by promulgating
the rule without public notice and providing only a fifteen-day delay before
the effective date, violated both requirements.72
After invalidating the rule, the court indirectly indicated that the rule may
represent an assumption of authority beyond the scope of section 504" and
may impinge on the constitutional interests of parents, infants, and health
68. Id. For example, the rules provided that it would be a violation of federal law to deny
an infant classified as handicapped "customary medical care." Id. As the court noted, however,
"there is no customary standard of medical care for the treatment of severely defective in-
fants." Id. (emphasis in original).
69. Id. The rulemaking process defined by § 553 of the APA is referred to as "informal"
or "notice and comment" rulemaking. W. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE
248 (2d ed. 1982). In the absence of specific directions in an agency's enabling legislation,
§ 553 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982), applies whenever a statute merely authorizes an
agency to issue regulations and the regulations will affect the rights of private individuals. W.
GELLHORN, supra, at 248. Since the only specific direction in the rulemaking portion of § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is the requirement that the Secretary submit copies of pro-
posed regulations to appropriate authorizing committees of Congress and that such regulation
may take effect no earlier than 30 days after the date of submission, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp.
V 1982), § 553 of the APA applies to the DHHS's rulemaking endeavors. See W. GELLHORN,
supra, at 248.
When the DHHS issues rules, three procedural requirements of § 553 of the APA must
be met. First, the DHHS must give notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). The notice must include "either the terms or substance of the pro-
posed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved," id. § 553(b)(3), as well as
reference to the legal authority for issuing the rule, id. § 553(b)(2), and information about
public participation, id. § 553(b)(3). Second, following publication, the DHHS must give in-
terested individuals an opportunity to participate through the submission of written comments,
and with its final rules issue a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. Id.
§ 553(c). Third, the DHHS must publish the rules not less than 30 days before their effective
date. Id. § 553(d).
70. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 398.
71. Id. at 400; see supra note 70.
72. Heckler, 561 F. Supp at 400. The rules were published on March 7, 1983, and, without
benefit of notice and comment, were to take effect on March 22, 1983. Additionally, the court
rejected the Secretary's arguments that the rulemaking effort was not subject to § 553, or,
in the alternative, that the circumstances justified waiver of § 553 requirements as "without
merit." Id. at 401. For a discussion of circumstances in which § 553 does not apply to agency
rulemaking , see generally W. GELLHORN, supra note 69, at 245-47 (describing exemptions which
give agencies discretion to determine level of public participation in rule-making endeavors).
73. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 401. It was the court's view that the legislative history did
not suggest that § 504 would be applicable to monitor medical care of defective newborns
or establish standards for preserving a particular quality of life. Id. As the court noted, "Many
would argue that had Congress intended section 504 to reach so far into such a sensitive area
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care providers." The court, however, declined to address these issues in a
pre-enforcement judicial review."
On July 5, 1983, the DHHS published a revised set of proposed rules in
the Federal Register and provided for a sixty-day notice and comment
period.76 The proposed rule duplicated the substance of the invalidated rule, 7
with only minor changes in the posting procedure." Further, the DHHS added
a requirement that state child protective service agencies were to establish
written procedures for identifying, investigating, and reporting to the DHHS
cases of treatment being withheld. 9 This requirement appeared to shift in-
vestigative responsibility primarily, but not exclusively, to state agencies."
Finally, DHHS added a supplementary information section" and an
appendix 2 to the proposed rules which attempted to clarify the intent of
the notice. 3
of moral and ethical concern, it would have given some evidence of that intent." Id. at 402.
In 1980, following the death of an infant who had Down's Syndrome and an intestinal obstruc-
tion, the DHHS and the hospital involved agreed to amend the hospital's written consent pro-
cedures. As amended, the procedures assured that cases involving lack of parental consent to
medically indicated treatment for handicapped infants would be reported to the state protective
services agency in the same manner as similar cases involving nonhandicapped children. The
DHHS apparently felt that the case did not warrant the type of action now contemplated by
the Secretary. Further, it appears that as late as 1980, the DHHS recognized that intervention
in decision-making was properly within the jurisdiction of only state child protective agencies.
See Protection and Advocacy Agency v. Kapiolani Children's Hospital, HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICEs Doc. No. 09-79-3158 (1980), cited in Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra
note 18, at 30,847-48 and in President's Commission, supra note 2, at 225-26 n.95.
74. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. at 402-03. Two constitutional challenges to the statute had been
advanced. The first challenge was that the statute was "vague and overbroad," thereby making
it difficult for health care providers to determine what kind of conduct that statute was meant
to prohibit. Id. at 402. The second challenge was that by not providing adequate procedural
safeguards to curb investigations resulting from anonymous hotline complaints, the statute con-
flicted with parents' and physicians' due process rights and rights to privacy. Id. at 402-03.
75. Id. The court determined that resolution of the issues should await application of the
regulation to particular conduct. Id.
76. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18. The comment period extended
from July 5, 1983 to September 5, 1983. Id. at 30,846.
77. See supra notes 63-75 and accompanying text. Compare Interim Final Rule, supra note
18 (invalidated rule) with Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 128 (proposed rule).
78. The required size of the notice was changed from 14" x 17" to 8 V2 " x 11 ". The place
where the notice was to be displayed was changed from actually in infant care wards to the




81. See id. at 30,846-51. The supplementary information section attempts to clarify the
meaning of handicaps as applied to infants, id. at 30,851, and defines when § 504 would be
applicable, id. at 30,847. Further, the section reviews the factual basis used as support for
the rulemaking efforts. Id. at 30,847-48. Finally, the section explains the substance of the rule.
Id. at 30,849-51.
82. See id. at 30,851-52.
83. See id. The appendix indicates that a clear violation of § 504 would occur if a federally
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III. PARENTAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS
CONCERNING MEDICAL CARE FOR THEIR CHILDREN
A. Background
1. Parental Authority
The parental right and duty to make decisions regarding medical care for
an infant is derived from several sources. Generally, parents have a con-
stitutionally protected right to control the care and upbringing of their
children." Although this right is not explicitly guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, the Supreme Court has repeatedly asserted that parents have
a constitutionally protected interest in raising their children free from un-
warranted government interference. The Court has further recognized a con-
assisted hospital denied care to a handicapped infant that would be provided but for the in-
fant's handicap. See id. Following this statement, the Secretary set forth three examples of
withheld care which would constitute a violation of § 504: 1) denial of treatment for any com-
plications associated with Down's Syndrome, including corrective surgery of an associated in-
testinal obstruction, esophageal atresia, or heart defect; 2) denial of care that would be given
to a handicapped infant, on grounds that a particular child is potentially mentally impaired,
blind, deaf, paralyzed, or lacking limbs; or 3) denial of treatment for correctable physical
anomalies associated with spina bifida (meningomyelocele), when the denial is based on anticipated
mental impairment, paralysis, or incontinence rather than on reasonable medical judgment that
treatment would be futile. See id. at 30,852. Additionally, the supplementary information sec-
tion clearly imposed an affirmative duty on all federally financed programs to ensure han-
dicapped infants receive nondiscriminatory treatment. See id. at 30,847.
84. Constitutional protection of parental rights to make decisions concerning their children
has developed under two basic analyses: the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process,
see infra note 85, and the right of privacy recognized under the first, fourth, fifth, ninth,
and fourteenth amendments, see infra note 86. See generally Keiter, Privacy, Children and
Their Parents: Reflections on and Beyond the Supreme Court's Approach, 66 MINN. L. REv.
459, 488-94 (1982) (discussing constitutional bases of parental responsibility doctrine); Levy,
The Rights of Parents, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (discussing concept of right of family privacy
as it relates to child neglect laws); Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution:
A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1980) (discussing Court's failure to articulate
a line of constitutional principles to justify its decisions concerning the conflicting rights of
children, parents, and society).
85. The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution protects the right of free
parental choice in matters affecting childrearing. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14
(1972) (state compulsory education law, as applied to Amish, violated parental rights to direct
their children's upbringing; Court recognized that parents have a fundamental interest in guiding
the religious future and education of their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-35 (1925) (compulsory education statute which barred parents from sending their children
to a religious school invalidated as constituting an unreasonable interference with the rights
of parents and guardians to control the upbringing and education of their children); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (Court invalidated a criminal statute which prohibited
teaching German to elementary school children as interfering with parental rights recognized
by the liberty clause of the fourteenth amendment); see also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978) ("It is now firmly established that 'freedom of personal choice in matters of
.. . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' "). Central to the Court's fourteenth amendment analysis is the recognition that
parents bear primary responsibility for decisions regarding childrearing. See, e.g., Wisconsin
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stitutional right of privacy which extends to certain aspects of the family
relationship, ranging from the decision to conceive children to matters of
childrearing and education." In addition to recognizing a parental right to
control the care and upbringing of their children, the Court has recognized
a corollary parental duty to care for and protect children throughout their
minority. 7 This duty includes the protection of their children's health by
recognizing the symptoms of illness and providing for proper medical care.88
Moreover, in most states, child abuse and neglect statutes assign parents
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (American tradition clearly establishes that parents have
the primary role in the upbringing of their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944) (responsibility for childrearing resides first with the parents).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (right of privacy includes right
of marriage, procreation, motherhood, childrearing, and education); Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (the right to privacy "encompasses and protects the personal in-
timacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and childrearing"); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S, 113 (1973) (constitutional right of privacy protects a decision to have an
abortion during the first trimester); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of privacy
protects the freedom of an unmarried person to use contraceptives); Griswald v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (zone of privacy created by the Bill of Rights protects married couples'
right to use contraceptives). For discussions concerning the right of privacy, see generally Huff,
Thinking Clearly About Privacy, 55 WASH. L. REV. 777 (1980); Note, Roe and Paris, Does
Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974).
Lower court opinions indicate that the right of privacy is broad enough to encompass the
right to decline medical treatment. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (competent adult has right of privacy to refuse or discontinue medical treat-
ment that would artificially and temporarily prolong life), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)
(right of privacy protects incompetent and competent individuals against unwarranted infringe-
ment of bodily integrity); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (incompetent person possesses
same right of privacy to decline medical treatment as does competent adult), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). For a discussion of the right to decline medical treatment, see Comment,
The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Under What Circumstances Does It Exist?, 18 DUQ.
L. REV. 607 (1980); Note, The Right of Privacy and the Terminally-Ill Patient: Establishing
the "Right-to-Die", 31 MERCER L. REV. 603 (1980).
87. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) ("The child is not the mere creature
of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations,").
88. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). Although the Supreme Court has never
established conclusively that the authority to make decisions regarding medical treatment is
within the ambit of parental rights, dicta in Parham suggests such a conclusion is justified.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion quoted Pierce for the proposition that parents have
a duty to prepare their children for additional obligations, adding, "Surely, this [duty] includes
a 'high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice . ..
[slimply because the decision of a parent is [disagreeable or involves risks] does not automatically
transfer the power to make the decision from the parents to. . . the state." Id. at 602-03.
Further, lower court opinions generally note parental constitutional rights and duties when analyz-
ing medical decisions. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978),
aff'd, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d
936 (1979).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33:495
the duty of providing necessary medical care for their children. 9 Finally,
parents possess the primary authority under tort law to make decisions con-
cerning medical care for their children because an infant is incapable of con-
senting to treatment. 90
2. Limits on Parental Authority
Although parents have a constitutionally protected right to control the care
and upbringing of their children, the right is not absolute."' Certain com-
pelling situations may warrant limitation of recognized parental authority
to act as primary decision-maker. 92 For example, when it appears that a
89. Child abuse and neglect statutes assign parents the duty to provide medical care in a
variety of formulations ranging from requirements to provide child support and necessaries,
to prohibitions against endangering the life or health of minors. Some statutes specifically assign
parents the duty to provide medical care. For a complete listing and analysis of child neglect
laws as of 1976, see S. KATZ, M. MCGRATH & R. HOWE, CHILD NEGLECT LAWS IN AMERICA
(1976). For an overview of state neglect laws, including tables that indicate which state statutes
authorize state intervention upon parental failure to provide medical care, see Katz, Howe,
& McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in America (Pts. I-IV), 9 FAM. L.Q. 1, 3, 7, 51, 73 (1975).
90. Tort law provides that an intentional touching of another's body without consent con-
stitutes a battery. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 9 (4th ed. 1971). Courts have con-
sistently held that medical treatment in the absence of informed consent or an emergency is
an actionable battery. See, e.g., Canturbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Oakes
v. Gilday, 351 A.2d 85 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976); Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783
(1976). Further, the general rule is that absent emergency circumstances, physicians need paren-
tal consent before they can give medical treatment to an infant. See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran,
126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (court stated general rule and indicated four exceptions
to the rule: emergency, emancipation, parents too remote to consent, and child close to maturity);
accord Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 300-01, 469
P.2d 330, 337 (1970). The rule recognizes that children,
by reason of their youth[,] are incapable of intelligent decision, as the result of
which public policy demands legal protection of their personal as well as their prop-
erty rights. . . . Hence it is not at all surprising that, generally speaking, the rule
has been considered to be that a surgeon has no legal right to operate upon a
child without the consent of his parents or guardian.
Bonner, 126 F.2d at 122. For a discussion of the parental consent requirement, see G. ANNAS,
L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, THE RIGHTS OF DOCTORS, NURSES AND ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
91 (1981); Brown & Truitt, The Right of Minors to Medical Treatment, 28 DE PAUL L. REV.
289, 298-303 (1979); Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging
Technology and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 817-20 (1980); Note,
Judicial Limitations on Parental Autonomy in the Medical Treatment of Minors, 59 NEB. L.
REV. 1093, 1096 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial Limitations]; Note, Birth Defective
Infants, supra note 4, at 610.
91. In Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), aff'd, 378 Mass. 732,
393 N.E.2d 836 (1979), the colirt stated that although there is a parental autonomy interest,
"parental rights . . . do not clothe parents with life and death authority over their children."
Id. at 744, 379 N.E.2d at 843; see e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upheld
parent's conviction for violating child labor laws by allowing children to distribute religious
pamphlets on public streets).
92. One commentator describes the basic needs of every child as including "food, clothing,
shelter, medical care and education." Note, Birth Defective Infants, supra note 4, at 603 n.6.
Parental failure to provide these necessaries could result in state intervention. Id. at 610.
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parental decision will jeopardize the health, educational development, emo-
tional well-being, or safety of an infant, the common law doctrine of parens
patriae"l provides the state with the right and duty to intervene to protect
the infant. More recently, the passage of child abuse and neglect statutes
provides the state with statutory authority to intervene when necessary to
protect a child." These statutes define minimum parental duties and pro-
vide for state intervention when parents fail to fulfill a duty owed to their
child. Further, most statutes allow for state intervention in health care deci-
sions by imposing a duty on parents to provide necessary medical care for
their children." Ordinarily, it is for the parents in the first instance to decide
what medical care is necessary. The state, however, has the power to in-
tervene in the medical decision-making process pursuant to its statutory
authority or its authority as parens patriae.
B. Analysis and Impact of Rules on Parental Right
in the Medical Decision-making Context
Despite precedent according parents the right, duty, and authority to act
as primary decision-makers for their infants, the DHHS has established a
new standard for medical decision-making. 6 Although, at first reading, the
proposed DHHS rules ostensibly preserve the current decision-making
process,9" close scrutiny reveals that they effect subtle changes and render
parental participation illusory. The changes are most apparent when the deci-
sion involves a seriously ill infant whose prognosis, with treatment, is
uncertain.
Currently, the physician's role in the medical decision-making process is
to evaluate the medical needs of the infant and provide parents with
reasonable medical judgments concerning recommendations for the infant's
care.9 ' Specifically, the physician must examine the infant, formulate a
93. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 89.
95. See id.
96. See Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,851. The appendix to
the rule explains that:
[I]t is unlawful . . . to withhold from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance
or medical or surgical treatment required to correct a life-threatening condition, if:
(1) the withholding is based on the fact that the infant is handicapped; and
(2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance
medically contraindicated.
Id.
97. See id. at 30,847. The supplementary information section indicates that the rules preserve
the customary medical decision making process in any treatment decision: the physician must
determine whether the treatment would be medically beneficial to the patient, and if the benefits
are outweighed by the risk associated with treatment. Id. The sentence immediately following
this assertion, however, indicates that subjective judgments that a patient's life may not be
worth living would violate the rules. Often, these judgments are inextricably intertwined in
the medical decision-making process. See infra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 655, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d
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diagnosis, and determine what treatment would be appropriate. The physi-
cian then presents recommendations to the parents. Based upon the physi-
cian's recommendations, the parents make the initial decision as to what
care will be provided. 99
When the infant is seriously ill and prognosis, with treatment, is uncer-
tain, the physician's role in evaluating and formulating recommendations
is crucial to the parents. By virtue of technical skills, professional training,
and experience, the physician is in the best position to explain the medical
realities of the situation to the parents.' Part of the physician's explana-
tion may include informing the parents of the medical reality that treatment
may afford the infant a dim prognosis for long-term survival or cure."'
In these instances, the physician and parents may freely discuss the benefits
and risks of treatment and explore the issue of whether treatment should
be withheld.' 2 After reviewing the recommendations and carefully weighing
all the alternatives with the physician, the parents have the primary respon-
sibility to accept or reject treatment for their infant. 103
Under the proposed rules, the medical decision-making process is subtly,
but dramatically, changed. As a threshold matter, the proposed rules pro-
vide that an infant classified as handicapped may not be denied treatment.'""
936, 940 (1979) (recognizing physician's role in providing recommendations as to treatment
options for the child). See generally G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 14-15 (describing roles of
parents and physicians in medical decision-making for infants); Duff & Campbell, supra note
11, at 892-93 (describing physician's role in decision making); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia,
supra note 4, at 224 (discussing physician's role in providing information to parents).
99. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
100. See G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 14-15.
101. See id.
102. See id. But see President's Commission, supra note 2, at 212-14. In some cases, physi-
cians may be unable to reach a decision to recommend withholding treatment. Id. In other
cases, physicians may believe they must make the decision to shield parents from feeling guilty
over a decision to withhold treatment. Id. As one physician stated:
[llt is important, that we make a recommendation of what is to be done. That
is not to say that we don't feel the parents have a decision to make, but it is
a decision with us and not a decision of their own. And we usually have felt it
is our duty to make a decision, and then have them agree with us, rather than
to have them feel they have made the decision completely on their own.
Id. at 210 n.56 (citing testimony of Ann Fletcher, M.D., transcript of the 16th meeting of
the President's Commission (Jan. 9, 1982), at 17). In still other cases, physicians may ex-
clude parents from the decision entirely or manipulate the parents' decision by offering a nar-
row range of choices. President's Commission, supra note 2, at 211. See generally R. STINSON
& P. STINSON, THE LONG DYING OF BABY ANDREW (1983) (parents describing their experience
of having a child in a neonatal intensive care unit); Bridge, The Brief Life and Death of
Christopher Bridge, 11 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 18 (Dec. 1981) (parents discussing dissatisfac-
tion concerning the amount of information they received concerning their critically ill infant);
Duff & Campbell, supra note 11, at 893 (report of study on decisions to withhold treatment
to neonates describing the ways in which parental desisions may be manipulated); Stinson, On
the Death of a Baby, ATL. MONTHLY, July 1979, at 64 (article by parents of a premature
infant describing their feelings of exclusion from decision-making concerning their son).
103. G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 14-15.
104. See supra note 96. The standard appears limited. By virtue of the confusion encom-
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Noncompliance with the rules will invite an investigation of the case,", possi-
ble court action,' 6 and a risk that federal funding will be withdrawn from
the health care facility.' 7 Because the physician makes the initial evaluation
of the infant and advises the parents of treatment options, the physician
becomes the first person responsible for ensuring that treatment decisions
are in compliance with the rules. Consequently, the physician's role as
evaluator of the infant's condition and advisor to the parents is expanded
to include the role of primary rule enforcer. In addition, by virtue of the
changes in the physician's role, the rules operate to shift the responsibility
for making the initial decision regarding care for the infant from the parents
to the physician.
In order to fulfill the responsibility of ensuring compliance with the rules,
the physician performing an evaluation of the infant must include in that
evaluation a determination of whether the infant is handicapped, and
therefore, within the purview of the rules. If the physician determines that
the infant could be classified as handicapped, the physician must formulate
recommendations for treatment according to the standards provided by the
rules. The rules specifically mandate that treatment may not be withheld
on the basis of an infant's handicap,'00 and indicate that, when an infant
is classified as handicapped, subjective considerations concerning the handicap
do not constitute reasonable medical judgment.' 9 The physician, therefore,
must formulate any recommendations carefully to ensure that they do not
present the appearance of being improperly based upon the infant's han-
dicap or appear tainted by subjective considerations concerning the infant's
handicap.
Further, when the infant is classified as handicapped, and is seriously ill
with an uncertain prognosis, the rules not only restrict the scope of the physi-
cian's recommendations, but the scope of the discussion between the parents
and the physician as well. The rules impose an obligation on health care
providers to take all necessary steps required to ensure treatment of the
passed in the rules, however, see infra notes 205-218 and accompanying text, treatment may
not be denied to an infant classified as handicapped.
105. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,849, 30,851. The rules pro-
vide for immediate investigation of hotline complaints. Id.
106. Id. at 30,848, 30,851. The rules indicate that court action must be taken where appropriate
to compel provision of nourishment and medical treatment to an infant. Id.
107. Id. at 30,849. Disclosure of medical records to agency investigators to ensure compliance
with § 504 is one of the requirements a federally funded hospital must comply with in order
to continue to receive federal funding. Id.
108. Id. at 30,852. Violations of the rules occur when a federally funded program denies
care that would be provided but for the infant's handicap. Id.
109. Id. at 30,847, "[Njon-medical considerations, such as subjective judgments that an
unrelated handicap makes a person's life not worth living," interjected in the decision-making
process are not legitimate grounds for a medical judgment and reliance on non-medical con-
siderations would violate the rules. Id. It is often difficult, however, to separate the effects
of the handicap from the medical decision. See infra notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
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handicapped infant.' 0 Consequently, to remain in compliance with the rules,
the physician may not freely explore with the parents the issue of withholding
treatment, despite the fact that treatment may offer little or no hope of
an underlying cure or long-term survival.'" When the infant is classified
as handicapped, the physician is obligated to discard any notions of
withholding treatment before talking to the parents.' 2 Further, because the
physician must take all necessary steps to ensure treatment of the handi-
capped infant, the physician must not assist the parents in making a non-
treatment decision." 3 Rather, the physician must recommend treatment or
risk the sanctions imposed by the rules. By virtue of this subtle, but dramatic
change, parental rights to make decisions are rendered illusory because parents
effectively have no right to refuse treatment when the infant is handicapped.
Either the parents must acquiesce to the physician's decision to treat the
infant or find themselves in court seeking the right to intervene in the
decision-making process. Thus, absent judicial approval parents have no right
to make a decision to withhold treatment from their handicapped infant.
As a result of the changes in the medical decision-making process when
the infant is handicapped, the rules effectively create two standards for
medical decision-making. One standard, applicable to non-handicapped in-
fants, accords parents the right to make a decision to withhold treatment
based upon extensive discussion concerning all options with the physician.
The other standard, to be used when the infant is classified as handicapped,
abrogates parents' rights to make decisions and shifts the decision to the
physician. This second standard, however, eliminates meaningful discussions
between the parents and physician. To regain their right to make a decision,
the parents are forced to seek judicial reaffirmation of the principle that
parents possess the primary right to make decisions concerning the medical
care of their children.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE MEDICAL
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Medical decision-making conflicts between parents and the state usually
110. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,848-49. The supplementary
information section provides:
[Wihile recipients may be restricted in their provision of treatment by the lack of
parental consent, it is no less their obligation to operate their program without
discrimination. This includes the obligation to report to appropriate officials
. . . parental refusal to consent to the provision of necessary medical treatment
and to cooperate with those officials while continuing to provide all care not disallow-
ed by the parents.
Id. Court action must be taken if necessary to compel provision of treatment. Id. at 30,851.
Ill. Counselling parents to make a decision to withhold treatment from a handicapped in-
fant is considered to be facilitation of discrimination and is disallowed by the rules. See supra
note 46.
112. See supra note 46.
113. See id.
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arise when parents have decided to refuse treatment of their child which
a physician, hospital, or other third party believes is necessary. The treat-
ment refused most often falls into one of three categories. The first category,
"life-saving treatment," is treatment that is immediately necessary to preserve
the infant's life and results in a good prognosis for a long and healthy life
after treatment.'' 4 The second category, "therapeutic treatment," is treat-
ment that is not immediately necessary for saving the life and carries some
risk, but will provide a benefit to the child." 5 The third category, "life-
prolonging treatment," is treatment that is highly intrusive, has painful side
effects, may or may not cure the underlying condition, and has an uncer-
tain prognosis." 6
Parental refusal of treatment is commonly based on religious grounds,'"
fear that the risk of treatment will outweigh the benefits to the child,'' 8 or
114. For purposes of this Comment, the definition of "life-saving" is based on a review
of cases in which treatment has been refused. See infra notes 149 & 150 and accompanying
text. Another commentator refers to this type of situation as "life-threatening." See Comment,
Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157, 157 n.4 (1983) ("the term 'life-threatening' generally refers to situa-
tions presenting imminent danger of death unless treatment is provided") [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Choosing for Children].
115. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. This definition was created for purposes
of this Comment and refers to treatment falling between "life-saving" and "life-prolonging."
116. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. Another commentator defines life-prolonging
treatment as "treatment that extends one's lifespan despite the fact that imminent death is
not anticipated." Comment, Choosing for Children, supra note 114, at 157 n.4; see also Brown
& Truitt, supra note 90, at 301 n.63 ("[Ilife-sustaining treatment refers to measures which pro-
long life or delay death in situations involving critical injuries or severe birth defects which
would either result in eventual death or a lingering vegetable state.").
117. Most cases involve parents who are Jehovah's Witnesses who believe blood transfusions
violate God's law, and therefore, will not consent to treatment which necessitates blood transfu-
sions for their children. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witness v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp.
488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex. rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411
I1. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); cf. In re Karwarth, 199 N.W.2d
147 (Iowa 1972) (father opposed surgical removal of tonsils and adenoids from his three minor
children because of his religious faith); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (parents
failed to provide medical assistance for their child because of their belief in divine healing);
State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, consented
to surgery for their infant but requested no blood transfusions), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1968); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (mother,
a Jehovah's Witness, refused to consent to blood transfusions necessary for corrective surgery
for her 15-year-old son), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 688, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d
900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d
128 (1962) (parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, refused blood transfusions necessary to save the life
of their three-year-old son who had been severely burned); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d
387 (1972) (parents, Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to consent to surgery for their son which
would require blood transfusions).
118. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (father, through adherence
to belief that mental healing would cure illness, instilled fear of surgery in 14-year-old son
and both refused surgery to repair son's cleft lip and palate); In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128,
263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (parents arbitrarily refused to consent to removal of two-year-old child's
malignant eye); In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1941)
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a belief that life-prolonging treatment is inappropriate. 19 The state, upon
notification of refusal of treatment on such grounds, will challenge the
parents' decision as a breach of parental duty or statutory neglect. 2 '
Typically, the state will seek legal custody of the child and appointment of
a guardian ad litem'2' in order to override the parents' decision and ensure
that the child receives the necessary care.' 22
A court presented with a request to override the parents' decision must
first decide whether the state should be allowed to intervene. In general,
parents are presumed to act in their child's best interest. '23 The burden of
overcoming this presumption tends to be placed on the state by common
law and by statute.2 ' As a result, courts generally afford parental preferences
(father persisted in failing to explain his reason for refusing to consent to corrective foot surgery
for his child); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1911) (parents objected to surgery out of
fear that the child would die if he underwent a major surgical procedure); In re Hudson, 13
Wash. 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (mother refused consent to amputation of her li-year-old
daughter's grossly malformed left arm because of fear that surgery would prove fatal).
119. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (parents refused
chemotherapy and radiation therapy for their leukemic son, asserting laetrile treatment would
be more appropriate), aff'd, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979); Dickson v. Lascaris, 53
N.Y.2d 204, 423 N.E.2d 361, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (1981) (father refused brain surgery for
his daughter stating there was "nothing we can do about it, let her die"); In re Hofbauer,
47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979) (parents refused chemotherapy and
radiation therapy as treatment for their son who had Hodgkins disease, asserting nutritional
therapy was more appropriate); In re Green, 12 Crime and Delinquency 377 (Child Div.,
Milwaukee County Ct. Wisc. 1966) (mother refused complicated and controversial treatment
for sickle cell anemia, an incurable disease).
Courts have rarely confronted situations in which parents refuse life-prolonging treatment
for their infants. See, e.g., In re Infant Doe, supra note 23 (parents of an infant afflicted
with Down's Syndrome and other defects refused life-prolonging surgery and medical care);
Maine Medical Center v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct. Cumberland County, Me. Feb. 14,
1974) (parents refused surgery for infant who had multiple defects); In re Teague, 140-212-81886
(Cir. Ct. Balt., Md. filed Dec. 4, 1974) (parents refused surgery to correct spinal column defect);
In re McNulty, No. 1960 (P. Ct. Essex County, Mass. Feb. 15, 1978) (parents refused heart
surgery for infant); In re Obenauer (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Mon., N.J. Dec. 22, 1970) (parents
refused surgery to correct duodenal atresia in their infant with Down's Syndrome); Weber v.
Stony Brook Hosp., 52 U.S.L.W. 2267 (Oct. 28, 1983) (parents and physicians agreed surgery
should be withheld from severely defective infant; third party intervened). With the exception
of In re Infant Doe and Weber, these cases are discussed in Brant, Last Rights: An Analysis
of Refusal and Withholding of Treatment Cases, 46 Mo. L. REV. 337, 365 (1981). See also
President's Commission, supra note 2, at 216 n.77, 222 n.87, 224 n.92, 225 n.94 (discussing
Houle, Teague, McNulty, and Obenauer).
120. For an analysis of the state's intervention in medical decision-making disputes, see Com-
ment, Choosing for Children, supra note 114. See also Note, Judicial Limitations, supra note 90.
121. A guardian ad litem is defined as a "special guardian appointed by the court to pro-
secute or defend, in behalf of an infant or incompetent, a suit to which he is a party, and
such guardian is considered an officer of the court to represent the interests of the infant or
incompetent in the litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (5th ed. 1979).
122. See Note, Judicial Limitations, supra note 90, at 1100.
123. See e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (reaffirming presumption that
parents generally act in their child's best interests).
124. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 794, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (1978) (applying
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significant deference and will override them only upon demonstration that
a parental decision threatens the child's well-being.'25 Thus, in the typical
medical conflict, the state must bring the action and prove that intervention
is necessary. When it is shown that a parental decision threatens a child's
well-being, the interests of the state and of the child may mandate
intervention. 126
Courts have used three approaches to resolve the conflict created by a
state's request to intervene in the medical decision-making process. Regardless
of which approach the court selects, the underlying issue in all cases is to
determine when and under what circumstances treatment may be ordered
over parental objections. The first approach is to determine whether a deci-
sion is compatible with the "best interest of the child."'27 The second ap-
proach is to use a "substituted judgment" to determine whether the child
would, if competent, make the same deicision. 28 The third approach, the
Hofbauer approach, is used in the limited context where parents and a physi-
cian agree upon a course of treatment, but a third party challenges the deci-
sion as inappropriate.' 29 Under the Hofbauer approach, the courts deter-
mine whether decisions made by the parents will provide medically accep-
table treatment for the child.
Although the best interest of the child and substituted judgment approaches
are conceptually distinct, both require the court to analyze the circumstances
under which the decision was made. 3' These circumstances include the child's
underlying condition and prognosis, with and without treatment, the mode
of treatment considered, the rationale for parental refusal, and the state's
interest in intervention. Both approaches focus primarily on protection of
the child's interest. The distinction, however, lies in the interest that will
be protected and the manner in which the decision will be made.' 3' In con-
trast, the Hofbauer approach emphasizes analyzing the propriety of the course
of treatment chosen.'3 2 Yet, this analysis involves consideration of many of
the same factors used in the first two approaches.' 33
state statute, court held that a child may be taken from parental custody on a showing that
the child is without necessary physical care and the parents are unwilling to provide the re-
quired care), aff'd, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
125. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), aff'd, 378
Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979) (parental prerogative treated with great deference); In re
Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979) (parents' choice as to
a mode of medical treatment for their child must be accorded great deference).
126. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 744, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (1978), aff'd, 378
Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
127. See infra notes 135-150 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 155-189 and accompanying text.
129. In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 656, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936, 941
(1979); see infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 135-189 and accompanying text.
131. See id.
132. See infra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
133. See id.
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Although the DHHS rules appear to preserve these existing approaches
to judicial conflict resolution, a close examination reveals otherwise. When
the infant is classified as handicapped, the rules impose a standard for resolu-
tion which, by its terms, precludes fair consideration of parental preferences
and prevents normal application of the existing approaches. The appendix
to the rules states that it is unlawful to withhold treatment from an infant
classified as handicapped if "(1) the withholding is based on the fact that
the infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap does not render the treat-
ment or nutritional sustenance medically contraindicated."' 34 Accordingly,
when faced with a dispute over a parental decision to withhold treatment
from a seriously ill infant whose prognosis, with treatment, is uncertain,
the court must initially determine whether the infant is handicapped within
the meaning of the rules. If the infant is determined to be handicapped,
the court must incorporate the standard imposed by the rules into the pro-
cess of judicial conflict resolution. Incorporation of that standard, however,
necessarily changes the manner in which existing judicial approaches are
applied.
A. The Best Interest of the Child Approach
1. Background
Courts have traditionally used the "best interest of the child" approach
to analyze parental decisions to refuse medical treatment of their children.
This standard has been used whether treatment was life-saving, therapeutic,
or life-prolonging. Under the "best interest" approach, a court will attempt
to reach a decision which will advance the best interest of the child.' Typical-
134. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,851.
135. The best interest approach is commonly used whenever the court must make determina-
tions regarding children. For example, the best interest approach has been used in post-divorce
child custody proceedings to determine jurisdiction, see, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 45 N.Y.2d
739, 380 N.E.2d 305, 408 N.Y.S.2d 479, reargument denied, 45 N.Y.2d 839, 381 N.E.2d 630
(1978); Marriage of Settle, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976); UNIFORM CHID CUSTODY JURISDIC-
TION ACT § 3(2), 9 U.L.A. 116 (1979), and to determine custody, see, e.g., In re Marriage
of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa 1974) (best interest standard used to transfer custody from
mother to father); Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966) (best interest
standard used to determine whether custody should be given father or grandparents), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 949 (1967); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1979).
In addition, the best interest standard has been used in adoption and legitimation proceedings.
See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254 (1978) (best interest standard used to deny
biological father's request to veto child's adoption). Finally, the standard has been used in
proceedings to determine whether medical treatment is appropriate. See, e.g., In re Phillip B.,
92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 54 (1979) ("The underlying consideration is
the child's welfare and whether his best interests will be served by the medical treatment");
In re Kawarth, 199 N.W. 2d 147, 150 (Iowa 1972) (parental rights cannot be invoked to refuse
medical treatment if the best interests and welfare of children in care and custody of the state
reasonably require medical treatment); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765, 775
(1942) (natural law gives parents the right to the custody and control of minor children and
may give to those children such attention as may seem in their best interests).
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ly, in a medical decision-making conflict, the parents have made a decision
that they believe is in the child's best interest. The state, however, seeks
to intervene in that decision by asserting its view of what would be in the
child's best interest. The approach is premised on the state's duty, under
the doctrine of parens patriae, to care for and protect the best interest of
the incompetent child.'36 Confronted with such a conflict between the parent
and the state, the court is required to determine which view is more related
to the child's best interest.' 31 The "best interest" standard is an amorphous
standard that can be defined only in relation to the facts of a particular
case."'3 Once these facts are examined, however, the court focuses on sanc-
tioning the decision most compatible with the newly defined child's best
interest. '9
136. Parens patriae, defined as "parent of the country," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003
(5th ed. 1979), originated in English common law and arose from recognition of the king's
"royal prerogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants, idiots
and lunatics." Id. Courts have further defined parens patriae as referring to the state's role
as sovereign and guardian of incompetents and minors. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 18 N.H.
422, 431, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955) (parens patriae is a right of sovereignty and imposes a duty
on the sovereignty to protect the public interest and to protect infants and incompetents); State
v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 475, 181 A.2d 751, 758 ("a sovereign right and duty to care for
a child and protect him from neglect, abuse and fraud during his minority"), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 890 (1962). At common law, courts exercised parens patriae power to protect the
interests of a child when parents failed in their duty to provide reasonable care for their children.
Perricone, 37 N.J. at 475, 181 A.2d at 758. More recently, however, the principle of parens
patriae has been incorporated into child abuse and neglect statutes. Id. For a discussion of
the history of parens patriae and its role in protecting children, see Areen, Intervention Bet-
ween Parent and Child, A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases,
63 GEO. L.J. 887, 887-93 (1975); Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27
EMORY L.J. 195 (1978); Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect, Part I: Historical Overview, Legal
Matrix and Social Perspective, 50 N.C.L. REV. 293, 313-28 (1972); Wald, State Intervention
on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985,
989-90 (1975); Note, Parent and Child-State's Right to Take Custody of a Child in Need
of Medical Care, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 342, 344-46 (1963); Note, Judicial Power to Order Medical
Treatment for Minors Over Objections of Their Guardians, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 84, 84-85
(1962); Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile
Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 894, 894-99 (1966).
137. See Note, Birth Defective Infants, supra note 4, at 606.
138. For criticism of the best interest of the child standard, see In re LaRue, 244 Pa. Super.
218, 226-27, 366 A.2d 1271, 1275 (1976) ("best interest" standard is too dependent upon the
convictions of social workers and judges). See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT,
BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 54 (1973) (many decisions are in "name only" for
the best interest of the child because they are fashioned primarily to meet needs and wishes
of competing adult claimants or to protect pplicies of child care agencies); Foster, Adoption
and Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 3 (1973) (absent ar-
ticulation of specific elements comprising a child's best interest, the phrase is a meaningless
cliche); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal
of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Ter-
mination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 649-50 (1976) (standard is deficient because
no state statute identifies specific factors for a court to consider in determining a child's best
interest); Note, Birth Defective Infants, supra note 4, at 606 ("the standard is in many ways
a fiction, because the child's interests depend on who is defining them").
139. See Note, Birth Defective Infants, supra note 4, at 607.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33:495
In making its determination, the court performs a tripartite analysis. The
court must first examine the medical decision itself. This involves identifica-
tion of the child's condition and prognosis, the nature and extent of the
treatment proposed, and the impact that refusal would have on the child's
condition.'14 The court must then identify the competing interests involved.
These include the interests of the child, the parents, and the state.,'4 In the
health care context, the child's interest is generally defined as being an in-
terest in health or life;' 2 the parents' interest is defined as an interest in
parental autonomy in decision-making;'4 3 the state's interests are defined as
the protection of the welfare of children, the preservation of life, and the
promotion of ethical integrity of the medical profession.' 4 4 Finally, the court
must balance the competing interests involved and reach a decision that best
protects the interests of all the parties. Resolution of the conflict should
balance the child's interest against those of the parents and the state. In
practice, however, the resolution process appears to balance only two in-
terests in a given case-either the child's against the parents' or the parents'
against the state's. Which of these two balancing approaches the court selects
140. One court has stated that:
Several relevant factors must be taken into consideration before a state insists upon
medical treatment rejected by the parents. The state should examine the seriousness
of the harm the child is suffering or the substantial likelihood that he will suffer
serious harm; the evaluation for treatment by the medical profession; the risks in-
volved in medically treating the child; and the expressed preferences of the child.
Of course, the underlying consideration is the child's welfare and whether his best
interests will be served by the medical treatment.
In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979), cert denied, 445
U.S. 949 (1980). Typically, court opinions begin with a review of the child's condition. See
e.g., State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1968); In
re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962). For a thorough discussion suggesting
how these facts should be analyzed, see Comment, Choosing for Children, supra note 114,
at 185-88.
141. Although courts have uniformly balanced these interests in making decisions, see infra
notes 145-48, formal identification of the three interests first appeared in a commentary. See
Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justification and Limitations 26 STAN. L. REv. 1383,
1383-84 (1974) (the issue places three sets of interests in conflict: (1) rights of the parents;
(2) responsibilities of the state; and (3) needs of the child). In Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass.
733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), aff'd, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979), the court granted
judicial recognition of this analysis. 375 Mass. at 747, 379 N.E.2d at 1062. Subsequent com-
mentary indicates adherence to the tripartite interest analysis suggested above. See Areen, supra
note 136, at 890-94, n.24; Horowitz, Of Love and Laetrile: Medical Decision Making in a
Child's Best Interests, 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 271-83 (1979); Comment, Choosing for Children,
supra note 118, at 166-84; Note, In re Hofbauer: May Parents Choose Unorthodox Medical
Care for Their Child?, 44 ALB. L. REV. 818, 837-47 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, May
Parents Choose?]; Note, Judicial Limitations, supra note 90, at 1107-14; Note, Birth Defective
Infants, supra note 4, at 602-05.
142. See Note, Birth Defective Infants, supra note 4, at 607.
143. See Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 747-48, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062-63 (1978),
aff'd, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
144. 375 Mass. at 754-55, 379 N.E.2d at 1066.
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appears to depend upon the child's condition and the parents' reason for
refusal.
For example, when a parent refuses treatment based upon religious grounds,
courts uniformly balance the parents' first amendment interest against the
child's competing interest in life.'4 1 In these cases, the child's interest fre-
quently prevails.'14  If the parents' refusal is based on other grounds,'47
however, the court balances the parents' interest in controlling matters of
childrearing against the state's competing interests in protecting the welfare
of children, preserving life, and preserving the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.' 8 Although the central focus remains on the child, the real battle
is over who should control the decision-the parents or the state. In this
type of balancing, the result appears dependent upon the child's condition
or the type of medical care required. To illustrate, courts are generally reluc-
tant to override parental decisions when the treatment is concededly beneficial
to the child, but not immediately necessary and one which exposes the child
145. In expressing this balancing process, one court stated:
[Plarents . . . have a perfect right to worship as they please .... But this right
• . . ends where somebody else's right begins. Their child is a human being in
his own right, with a soul and body of his own. He has rights of his own-the
right to live and grow without disfigurement.
In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 90, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (1962); see also supra note 117.
146. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witness v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash.
1967) (court may order a blood transfusion over parent's religiously grounded objections), aff'd,
390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Il1. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (court
ordered a blood transfusion over parent's religiously grounded objections), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 824 (1952); In re Kawarth, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972) (court affirmed juvenile court
order requiring operations to be performed on three children despite father's objections); State
v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (court sustained order for compulsory blood transfu-
sion for infant despite objections of parents who were Jehovah's Witnesses), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 890 (1968); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970)
(court ordered corrective surgery and transfusions for child with facial lesion despite parents'
religious objections), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 688, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900,
278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128
(1962) (court ordered transfusions for three-year-old child over mother's objections). But see
Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (court refused to order medical treatment
over parents' religiously based objections); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972)
(court upheld parents' religious objections to surgery to repair severe curvature of the spine).
147. See supra notes 118 and 119.
148. In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-41,
370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977), the court reviewed decisions concerning the competent adult's
rights to decline medical treatment and identified four competing state interests: "(1) the preser-
vation of life; (2) the protection of interests of innocent third parties; (3) the prevention of
suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." Id. More recently,
in Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 754-55, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1066 (1978), aff'd, 378 Mass.
732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979), the court identified the competing state interests when the patient
is a child: (1) protecting the welfare of children living within its borders; (2) preservation of
life; and (3) protecting the ethical integrity of the medical profession. For a discussion of the
state interests, see generally Clarke, supra note 90, at 813-17 (describing state interests); Corn-
ment, Choosing for Children, supra note 114, at 169-70 (describing state interests generally);
Note, Birth Defective Infants, supra note 4, at 604-05 (reciting state interests).
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to risk."'9 If the treatment is immediately necessary, whether life-saving or
life-prolonging, the courts will override the parents' decision because the
child's interest in life allows no other outcome.' Regardless of the ultimate
decision, the cases analyzed under the best interest approach stand for the
proposition that, even in the state's exercise of parens patriae power, there
must be respect for the rational decision of the parents who are seeking
to protect their child.
2. Analysis of Proposed Rules and Best Interest of Child Approach
When the infant is classified as handicapped, the court's analysis under
a best interest approach is modified significantly. First, the court's examina-
149. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (court refused to order
corrective surgery for 14-year-old boy's cleft lip and palate); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292
A.2d 387 (1972) (court upheld parent's refusal to consent to surgery to correct their 17-year-old
son's spinal curvature because child's life was not in danger and risks involved in surgery were
high); In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. D. 561 (1911) (court upheld parents' right to refuse corrective,
but not life-saving, surgery that would prevent their seven-year-old son from becoming crippled
from rickets); In re Frank, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952) (parental failure to treat
child's speech impediment not ground for depriving father of custody); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d
673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (court upheld parents' refusal to consent to amputation of their
I 1-year-old daughter's grossly malformed arm because the court found sufficient risk in surgery
to justify mother's objection). But see In re Ray, 95 Misc. 2d 1026, 408 N.Y.S.2d 737 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1978) (court ordered psychiatric treatment for 10-year-old girl on theory that state
may intervene when treatment will have a beneficial effect); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658,
317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970), (court ordered surgery to correct facial deformity
on a 15-year-old despite parental objections and despite the fact that the physician testified
that the surgery would be more safely performed when the child was older), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d
688, 323 N.Y.S.2d. 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
150. For cases where the court ordered life-saving treatment, see Jehovah's Witness v. King
County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (court may order transfusion for children
when necessary to save life), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,
411 I11. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952) (transfusion ordered where
danger of death or permanent retardation would follow without treatment); Morrison v. State,
252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952) (transfusion ordered where danger of death would follow
without treatment); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (upheld order for transfu-
sion where danger of death would follow without treatment), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1968);
In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933) (court ordered surgicial removal of two-
year-old child's malignant eye); In re Brooklyn Hosp., 45 Misc. 2d 914, 258 N.Y.S.2d 621
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (transfusions ordered for five-year-old child suffering from burns); In
re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962) (court ordered transfusion for severely
burned three-year-old child).
For cases in which the court ordered life-prolonging treatment, see Maine Medical Center
v. Houle, No. 74-145 (Super. Ct. Cumberland County, Me. Feb. 14, 1974) (court ordered surgery
on infant who had multiple birth defects); In re Teague, 212-81886 (Cir. Ct. Bait., Md. filed
Dec. 4, 1974) (court ordered surgery to repair infant's spina bifida); In re McNulty, No. 9190
(P. Ct. Essex County, Mass. 1978) (court ordered heart surgery for infant); In re Obenauer
(Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Mon. N.J. Dec. 22, 1970) (court ordered surgery to repair duodenal
atresia in an infant with Down's Syndrome). But see Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 575 F.
Supp. 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (court refused to order surgery in infant who had microcephaly,
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tion of the decision necessarily changes. Traditionally, the court identified
the child's condition and prognosis, the nature and extent of treatment pro-
posed, and the impact that refusal would have on the child's condition. When
the infant is handicapped, however, the court must further analyze whether
the decision was based on the infant's handicap and whether the handicap
renders the treatment medically contraindicated.'1' This analysis is limited
to an objective medical inquiry because the rules reject subjective considera-
tion in medical decision-making. '52 If the court determines that the decision
to withhold treatment was based on the infant's handicap, further interest
analysis and balancing is precluded because the rules expressly prohibit deci-
sions made on the basis of handicap. ' The court is, therefore, required
to enter an order compelling treatment. Stopping the analysis at this point
effectively precludes any consideration of parental preferences and abrogates
parents' rights to participate in the decision-making process.
On the other hand, if the court determines that the decision to decline
treatment for the handicapped infant does not appear to be based on the
infant's handicap, the court may proceed to perform an interest analysis
and balance all the interests. Yet, the DHHS rules have necessarily altered
the interest analysis and balancing process. Because the rules specifically evince
an intent to ensure that handicapped infants receive treatment, the infant's
best interest must be presumptively defined as an interest in receiving treat-
ment. In addition, by virtue of the rules, the state's interest is also an in-
terest in treatment.'"" Defining the infant's and state's interest in this man-
ner makes both interests identical and necessarily skews the court's balanc-
ing process toward providing treatment.
For example, under a typical best-interest analysis, the infant, parents,
and state have three separate interests which are granted equal weight at
the outset of the balancing process. The manner in which the interests are
ultimately balanced depends upon the circumstances of the case. Generally,
the court, seeking to protect the child, will balance the decision in favor
of either the state's interest or the parents' interest, depending upon which
interest most closely corresponds to the child's interest. When the infant
is classified as handicapped, however, the balance is skewed toward treat-
ment because the state and infant's interest are identical. The two interests
will, therefore, outweigh the single countervailing parents' interest from the
hydrocephaly and spina bifida); In re Infant Doe, supra note 23 (court refused to order surgery
to correct esophageal atresia with TEF in infant with Down's Syndrome), cert. denied, 52
U.S.L.W. 3361 (Nov. 8, 1983); In re Green, 12 Crime and Delinquency 377 (Child Div.,
Milwaukee County Ct. Wisc. 1966) (court refused to order treatment for child's incurable sickle
cell anemia).
151. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,851.
152. Id. at 30,847.
153. Id. at 30,852.
154. Id. at 30,846. The Rules specifically indicate that the DHHS will rely heavily on the
cooperation of state and local agencies to ensure enforcement of the rules, thereby making
the state interest that of ensuring treatment.
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outset of the balancing process. Further, since the rules reject consideration
of parental preferences in decisions when the infant is handicapped, the court
will be unable to accord significant weight to a parental decision to decline
treatment. As a result, the balancing process is illusory because the court's
decision is predetermined by virtue of the way the interests must be defined.
B. The Substituted Judgment Approach
1. Background
The "substituted judgment" ' approach permits the court to protect the
right of the incompetent individual or the child to decline medical
treatment.'"6 In the context of medical decision-making conflicts, this
approach arose primarily in response to the issue of whether potentially life-
prolonging treatment should be withheld from an individual who is incapable
of making decisions.'" Courts recognized that imposing life-prolonging treat-
155. Substituted judgment may be defined as the doctrine which requires a surrogate to attempt
to reach a decision that an incompetent person or child would make if he or she were able
to choose. The doctrine of substituted judgment originated in English common law and was
used to provide a means to authorize a gift from an incompetent person's estate to individuals
whom the incompetent person was not otherwise obligated to support. To accomplish its pur-
pose, an English court attempted to substitute itself, as nearly as possible, for the incompetent
and act according to the same motives and considerations as would have moved the competent
individual. In effect, the court would "don the mental mantle of the incompetent." Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977).
More recently, the doctrine of substituted judgment has been incorporated into the context
of medical decision-making for incompetents and children. See infra notes 176-189 and accom-
panying text. In essence, the doctrine of substituted judgment in medical decision-making con-
flicts demands that "the decision [u]ltimately reached' . . . should be that which would be
made by the incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account the
present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors which would necessari-
ly enter into the decision-making process of the competent person." Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at
752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431. For commentary which discusses substituted judgment, see Presi-
dent's Commission, supra note 2, at 44-45, 132-34; Clarke, supra note 90, at 824-26; Mueller
& Phoenix, supra note 4, at 522; Shapiro, supra note 34, at 140-41; Comment, Withholding
Treatment From Defective Newborns: Substituted Judgment, Informed Consent and the Quinlan
Decision, 13 GoNz. L. REV. 781, 791-95 (1979); Note, Judicial Limitations, supra note 90, at
1108-09.
156. The right to decline life-prolonging medical treatment is based in the constitutionally
protected right of privacy and in common law notions of bodily integrity. See, e.g, Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-39, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424
(1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-39, 355 A.2d 647, 663, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
In addition, statutes in several states provide for a "right to die" and allow individuals to
direct a physician to withhold treatment. See, e.g., Westfall, Beyond Abortion: The Potential
Reach of a Human Life Amendment, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 118 (1983). For commentary
discussing the right to decline medical care, see Brant, supra note 119; Comment, The Right
to Refuse Medical Treatment: Under What Circumstances Does It Exist?, 18 DUQ. L. REV.
607 (1980); Note, The Right of Privacy and the Terminally Ill Patient: Establishing the "Right
to Die", 31 MERCER L. REV. 603 (1980).
157. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-39, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976), marked the first case in which a court used the doctrine of substituted judgment
to allow a decision to discontinue life-prolonging treatment for an incompetent adult. Since
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ment which a competent adult could freely refuse does not always serve the
best interests of an incompetent adult.' To resolve this problem, courts
began to incorporate the substituted judgment approach into their analyses of
medical decision-making conflicts.
For example, in In re Quinlan,' the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the right to refuse highly intrusive and life-prolonging treatment is a
valuable incident of the right to privacy.'60 This privacy right should not
be discarded because an individual's condition prevents conscious exercise
the Quinlan decision, a number of courts have used the substituted judgment doctrine to analyze
a decision to decline life-prolonging treatment for incompetent individuals. See infra note 171.
The earliest cases using substituted judgment, however, involved requests for surgery to be
performed on mentally incompetent individuals. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1969) (court applied substituted judgment to order kidney transplant from mentally
incompetent ward of the state to his brother); In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d
783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (court ordered nonemergency surgery requested by the state for an
institutionalized 22-year-old mentally retarded man to enable the man to work and decrease
his dependency).
158. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
746, 370 N.E.2d 417, 428 (1977).
159. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Quinlan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether life-prolonging treatment
should be withdrawn from a 22-year-old girl who was in an irreversible chronic vegetative state,
had no awareness of her surroundings, and existed at a primitive reflex level. For reasons still
unclear, Karen Ann Quinlan had stopped breathing for two 15-minute periods and could not
be resuscitated. As a result, Karen suffered extensive neurologic damage and was dependent
upon a respirator, tube feedings, medications, catheters, and around-the-clock care to stay alive.
Confronted with the knowledge that no form of treatment was available which could cure or
restore Karen to cognitive life, Karen's parents requested discontinuation of the respirator. The
physicians refused to comply with the parents' request. Consequently, the Quinlans commenced
legal action, seeking appointment as legal guardian for Karen and express power to authorize
discontinuance of the respirator. The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the constitutional
right of privacy as the basis for its decision to grant the father and guardian the right to
authorize discontinuance of the respirator, but rejected the parents' arguments based on first
amendment freedom of religion and eighth amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. at 37-42, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
160. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. In reaching its decision, the court determined that the con-
stitutionally protected right of privacy is "broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to
decline medical treatment under certain circumstances in much the same way as it is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions."
Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. The court then balanced the right to decline medical treatment
for Karen against the asserted competing state interests in the preservation of life and the defense
of the physician's right to administer medical treatment according to his best judgment. Weighing
the balance in favor of the right to decline treatment, the court stated:
We think that the State's interest [in treatment] weakens and the individual's right
to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State
interest. It is for that reason that we believe Karen's choice, if she were competent
to make it, would be vindicated by the law. Her prognosis is extremely poor,-she
will never resume cognitive life. And the bodily invasion is very great. . . . If a
putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to ter-
minate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right to privacy,
as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that
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of choice.' 6 ' In the court's opinion, the only practical way to preserve the
right was to allow the parents and guardians to render their best judgment
as to whether their child, if competent, would decline treatment.' 62 In allowing
this substituted judgment, the court held that an incompetent person has
the same right to refuse treatment as a competent adult, even though some-
one else actually makes the decision. 163
The doctrine of substituted judgment received extensive consideration in
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz.' 64 In Saikewicz, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether pain-
ful and invasive chemotherapy treatments should be ordered for a sixty-seven
year-old profoundly retarded man who had been recently diagnosed as having
her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.
Id. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664. Recognition of the fact that the state interest in the preservation
of life weakens when the treatment is characterized as highly intrusive and merely life prolong-
ing marks a subtle, but dramatic, departure from the best interest analysis. Traditionally, under
a best interest analysis, courts did not distinguish between forms of treatment. Further, the
state's interest in life almost universally outweighed the right to decline treatment. See supra
notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
161. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10 (1975), 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
162. Id. The court imposed the qualification that any decision made by the physician, guar-
dian, and family to discontinue treatment had to be submitted to a hospital "ethics" commit-
tee. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. If the committee agreed that there was no reasonable possibility
of Karen ever emerging from her vegetative state, the life support system could be withdrawn
and such action would be without civil or criminal liability on the part of any of those in-
volved in the decision. Id.
The qualifications imposed by the court resulted from the special circumstances of the Quinlan
case. As a threshold matter, the court noted that recognition of the right to decline life-prolonging
treatment was contrary to prevailing medical practice which provided for discontinuing treat-
ment only when the patient was legally dead. Further, at the time, there was little in the way
of pre-existing legislative and judicial guidance regarding the rights and liabilities of those in-
volved in a decision to withhold life-prolonging treatment. Id. Nonetheless, the court recognized
that advances in medical technology had created a serious dilemma for the medical profession.
Specifically, the court asked:
When does the institution of life-sustaining procedures, ordinarily mandatory, become
the subject of medical discretion in the context of administration to persons in
extremis? And when does the withdrawal of such procedures, from such persons
supported by them, come within the orbit of medical discretion? When does a deter-
mination as to either of the foregoing contingencies court the hazard of civil or
criminal liability on the part of the physician or institution involved?
Id. at 43, 355 A.2d at 665 (emphasis in original).
In the court's view, primary reliance on ethics committees to review decisions to withhold
treatment would offer several advantages. These included the fact that the committee would
be readily accessible, would allow for dialogue, and could operate to screen decisions. In addi-
tion, the court stated that requiring application to courts to confirm decisions would be a
gratuitous encroachment on the medical profession and would be impossibly cumbersome. In
the court's opinion, such decisions should come before the court only if there is a justiciable
controversy. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669. But see Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (courts are the most appropriate forum
to analyze decisions to decline medical treatment).
163. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664.
164. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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leukemia.' 5 The treatments offered little hope of recovery, but non-treatment
meant certain death within weeks or months.'66 In reaching the decision to
allow treatment to be withheld, the court affirmed the Quinlan holding and
endorsed the use of the doctrine of substituted judgment in this context.' 7
The rationale supporting the decision was to ensure that competent and in-
165. Id. Saikewicz had an I.Q. of 10, a mental age of two years and eight months, and
had resided in state institutions since 1923. With chemotherapy, Saikewicz had a 30-50% chance
for remission from leukemia; remission means abatement of symptoms. The toxic side effects
of chemotherapy, however, included pain, discomfort, depressed bone marrow, anemia, in-
creased chance for infection, bladder irritation, and loss of hair. Because of his retardation,
Saikewicz would be unable to understand or cooperate fully with the treatment. Id.
166. Remission would last from two to 13 months at which time chemotherapy would have
to be reinstituted. Left untreated, Saikewicz would live a matter of weeks or months. Accord-
ing to testimony, a decision to withhold treatment would not result in pain and death would
come without discomfort. Id. at 734, 370 N.E.2d at 422.
167. Id. at 739-40, 370 N.E.2d at 424. The Massachusetts Supreme Court considered three
issues: (1) the nature of the right of individuals, competent or incompetent, to refuse potential-
ly life-prolonging treatment; (2) the manner in which an incompetent individual is to be accorded
the status in law of a competent person with respect to the exercise of the right to refuse
treatment; and (3) the procedures to be followed in reaching the decision. Id. at 737, 370 N.E.2d
at 423.
The court resolved the first two issues by stating that the substantive rights of the competent
and incompetent person are identical in regard to the right to decline potentially life-prolonging
treatment. Both possess a constitutional right of privacy which encompasses the right to decline
medical treatment where the illness is incurable. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424. To accord
the incompetent person the status in law of a competent person and allow for exercise of
the right to decline the treatment, the court adopted the substituted judgment doctrine used
in Quinlan. Id.
The court resolved the third issue by articulating the procedures to be followed in reaching
a decision for an incompetent person. The court rejected the Quinlan court's view that deci-
sions to withhold treatment should be referred to an ethics committee for review and held
that judicial review would provide more appropriate procedural safeguards. In contrast to the
Quinlan court, the Saikewicz court stated:
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and awesome question-
whether life-prolonging treatment should be withheld from a person incapable of
making his own decision as constituting a "gratuitous encroachment" on the domain
of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of life and death seem to us to require
the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision that forms the
ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created. Achieving this ideal
is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is not to be entrusted to
any other group purporting to represent "the morality and conscience of our society,"
no matter how highly motivated or impressively constituted.
Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435. For criticism of the requirement of judicial review of decisions
to withhold treatment see Kindregan, The Court as a Forum for Life and Death Decisions:
Reflections on Procedures for Substituted Consent, Il SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 919, 928-31 (1977);
Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J.L. & MED. 238, 240 (1978).
Following the Saikewicz decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court slightly limited the re-
quirement of judicial review of decisions to withhold treatment to those situations in which
the patient is confronted with a substantial choice. In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466,
380 N.E.2d 134 (1978). The court noted the limitation because the medical profession had in-
terpreted Saikewicz to require judicial approval of orders not to attempt resuscitation of an
incompetent terminally ill patient. Id. at 469, 380 N.E.2d at 136. In the Dinnerstein court's
opinion, if the patient was terminally ill and suffered a cardiac or respiratory arrest, the deci-
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competent individuals were afforded the same dignity and worth and the
same panoply of rights to refuse medical treatment.' The only distinction
between the competent and incompetent person is how their rights are exer-
cised. In the case of the incompetent person, the right must be exercised
through another person.'69 The person exercising substituted judgment is
charged with the responsibility to effectuate as nearly as possible the in-
dividual's actual values and preferences. This process involves considering
both the factors which favor treatment and the factors which favor withholding
treatment.' 70 A recurring theme in both Quinlan and Saikewicz is the notion
that, to the greatest extent possible, the individual should make personal
decisions and exercise free choice regarding medical treatment.'7 '
After recognizing the right to decline life-prolonging medical treatment
and allowing for the use of substituted judgment to exercise that right, the
Saikewicz court indicated that the decision to refuse treatment for an in-
sion of whether or not to resuscitate should remain with the physician. Id. at 472, 380 N.E.2d
at 138.
168. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
169. Id. at 736-37, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
170. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431. The court stated that:
[tihe primary test is subjective in nature-that is, the goal is to determine with
as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the individual involved.
• . . While [when the individual is retarded] it may thus be necessary to rely to
a greater degree on objective criteria, such as the supposed inability of profoundly
retarded persons to conceptualize fear of death, the effort to bring the substituted
judgment into step with the values and desires of the affected individual must not,
and need not, be abandoned.
Id. at 750-51, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31. In Saikewicz, the court identified the fact that most people
would elect chemotherapy and the chance of a longer life as the factor weighing in favor of
treatment. Factors identified as weighing against treatment were the patient's age, the side ef-
fects of treatment, the low chance of remission, the certainty that treatment would cause im-
mediate suffering, and the patient's inability to cooperate with treatment. The court explicitly
rejected the notion that quality of life considerations played any part in balancing the factors.
After weighing all the factors for and against treatment, the court determined that the decision
made by the probate judge to withhold treatment was appropriate. For commentary discussing
what factors should be considered by a court analyzing a decision to withhold treatment from
a child, see Comment, Choosing for Children, supra note 114, at 185-88.
171. For cases following Saikewicz which recognize the right of adults, competent and in-
competent, to refuse treatment, see In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (court authorized
order not to resuscitate 55-year-old auto accident victim in an irreversible coma); Satz v. Perlmut-
ter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (court permit-
ted removal of respirator as desired by competent 73-year-old adult terminally ill with Lou
Gehrig's disease); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (court used substituted
judgment to authorize termination of dialysis treatment for 78-year-old mentally incompetent
man who was in kidney failure and had organic brain disease); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d
43, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980) (court authorized removal of respirator for 83-year-old man in
an irreversible coma who had expressed disapproval for life-prolonging measures when he was
competent), modified, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 436 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981). But see In
re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (court overruled mother's
decision to discontinue treatment and blood transfusions for her 52-year-old retarded son with
untreatable cancer, but analogized the transfusions required to treat anemia to the provision
of nourishment).
19841 WITHHOLDING TREATMENT FROM INFANTS 529
competent must be analyzed in the same manner as a decision made by a
competent individual.'72 Specifically, a reviewing court must determine not
only whether the incompetent individual would decline treatment, but also
whether the circumstances are appropriate for the exercise of the right to
decline life-prolonging medical treatment.'73 The court's analysis of the cir-
cumstances is similar to that required under a best interest analysis. The
question of whether the exercise of substituted judgment is appropriate
depends upon a careful balancing of the individual's decision against counter-
vailing state interests."'
Recently, some courts have employed the substituted judgment approach
in cases involving children after recognizing that a child's best interests are
not necessarily served by imposing treatment which would not be imposed
on a competent adult who refused treatment.' 75 Custody of a Minor,"'
decided in 1978, marked the first such instance in which a court used the
doctrine of substituted judgment to analyze a parental decision to refuse
conventional medical care for their child. In Minor, the issue before the
court was the extent of parental rights to choose the type of medical treat-
ment their leukemic child should receive.' 77 Withholding conventional treat-
172. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Saikewicz court identified four countervailing state interests which must be assessed
when a person declines treatment: an interest in the preservation of life; an interest in pro-
tecting innocent third parties; an interest in the prevention of suicide; and an interest in main-
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id.
In the court's view, the state's interest in preserving life is the most significant interest to
be balanced against a decision to decline life-prolonging treatment. Nevertheless, the Saikewicz
court recognized that when circumstances indicate that treatment will be only life-prolonging,
the state interest pales in significance. As the court noted: "There is a substantial distinction
in the State's insistence that human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as opposed
to the State interest where ... the issue is not whether but when, for how long, and at what
cost to the individual that life may be briefly extended." Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
But see supra note 150 (under a best interest analysis, no distinction is made between life-
saving and life-prolonging treatment).
The court dispensed with the state interest in preventing suicide stating that the act of declin-
ing life-prolonging medical treatment does not constitute suicide. Id. at 743, 370 N.E.2d at
426 n. 11. The court further noted that the third interest is only implicated when innocent par-
ties, such as children, would suffer emotional and financial damage from an adult's decision
to refuse treatment. Id. at 742-43, 370 N.E.2d at 426. Finally, the court indicated that recogni-
tion of the right to decline life-prolonging treatment would not endanger the ethical integrity
of the medical profession because allowing individuals to refuse treatment in situations where
treatment offers little or no hope for cure comports with existing medical mores. Id. at 743-44,
370 N.E.2d at 426-27.
175. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
176. 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), aff'd, 378 Mass. 732, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
177. In 1977, 20-month-old Chad Green was diagnosed as having acute lymphocytic anemia.
375 Mass. at 737, 379 N.E.2d at 1056. The only known medically effective treatment for Chad's
type of leukemia was a three-year chemotherapy program which involved three phases. Chad
underwent the first phase of treatment and tests indicated that he was in remission. During
the second phase of treatment, the Green family moved and requested that their new physician
administer chemotherapy with a special diet which included laetrile. Although the physician
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ment would not mean immediate death, but the possibility for long-term
survival was uncertain. 78 The court recognized that, in the context of medical
decision-making for children, the best interest approach and substituted judg-
ment approach are essentially coextensive;'" 9 each involves consideration of
the same factors and similar analyses. The distinguishing feature is that the
substituted judgment approach recognizes the child's right to refuse life-
prolonging treatment.'80 In other words, unlike the decision in the best in-
terest approach, which is made for the child, the decision under substituted
judgment is viewed as being made by the child.' 8'
In 1982, the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the use of the substituted
judgment analysis to decline medical treatment for an infant in Custody of
a Minor.'82 The issue before the court was whether the juvenile court erred
in employing a substituted judgment analysis to allow for the withholding
of treatment from an infant.' 83 The infant, terminally ill, was abandoned
by his mother at birth and was a ward of the state.'8 The Department of
Social Services and the guardian ad litem refused to consent to the physi-
advised the parents that the diet would be ineffective, he granted the request. At the end of
the second phase, Chad was still in remission. During the third phase, the parents, without
the knowledge of the physician, discontinued the oral medications Chad required. When tests
indicated Chad was no longer in remission, the physician confronted the Greens. Despite repeated
requests by the physician to reinstitute treatment with oral medication, the parent's refused.
Pursuant to an order of temporary guardianship for supervision of medical treatment,
chemotherapy was reinstituted and Chad was again in remission. The Greens petitioned the
court for full custody of Chad and permission to supplement chemotherapy with laetrile. Id.
at 737, 379 N.E.2d at 1056. For a thorough discussion of Minor, see Note, Judicial Limita-
tions, supra note 90.
178. Minor, 375 Mass. at 737, 379 N.E.2d at 1057. Medical studies indicated that a cure
would be possible in 50% of such cases. Id. The court identified several factors weighing in
favor of treatment. First, treatment offered a substantial chance for cure in a child of Chad's
age. Second, there was no effective alternative treatment and the side effects of chemotherapy
were minimal. The court further noted that Chad appeared healthy and with treatment would
be able to carry on normal activities of childhood. Without treatment, Chad would almost
certainly die. On the other hand, the court found only two factors weighing against treatment:
first, the possibility that chemotherapy would cause serious side effects; second, Chad's inabil-
ity to understand the importance of chemotherapy. The court concluded that neither factor
was substantial enough to outweigh continuation of chemotherapy.
179. Id. at 753, 379 N.E.2d at 1065. The court characterized the best interest approach as
objective in nature, whereas the substituted judgment approach was characterized as subjective
in nature because the court is required to determine the actual preferences. See supra note 170.
180. Minor, 375 Mass. at 753, 379 N.E.2d at 1065. Although the court did not explicitly
state that a child has a constitutionally protected right to decline life-prolonging treatment,
the court cited Saikewicz for the proposition that substituted judgment "seeks to ensure that
the personal decisions concerning the conduct of individual affairs remain, to the greatest extent
possible, with the individual ...[and recognizes] the free choice and moral dignity of the
incompetent person." Id.
181. Id.
182. 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982).
183. Id. at 698 n.1, 434 N.E.2d at 602 n.l.
184. Id. at 701, 434 N.E.2d at 604. The four-month-old infant was suffering from an in-
operable heart defect and would not survive the first year of life, with or without treatment.
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cian's request for a "no code" order.' 85 The hospital, therefore, requested
the juvenile court to determine whether such an order was appropriate. 86
After reviewing the evidence which weighed against treatment,' 87 the juvenile
court used substituted judgment analysis'and held that, if competent, the
infant would decide to forego the use of heroic measures and that no counter-
vailing state interest would prohibit the entry of a "no code" order.' 88 In
affirming the juvenile court holding, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
recognized that a terminally ill infant possessed the right to decline life-
prolonging treatment.' 89
2. Analysis of the Proposed Rules and the Substituted Judgment Approach
When an infant is classified as handicapped, incorporation of the stan-
dards imposed by the DHHS rules into the substituted judgment approach
effectively forecloses meaningful use of the approach. The rules provide that
treatment may not be withheld on the basis of a handicap and may not
be withheld if medically indicated. Pursuant to the rules, the court's inquiry
is limited to an objective medical inquiry which does not encompass subjec-
tive considerations. Because the rules reject subjective considerations and
because determination of the infant's actual preferences is, by nature,
subjective,' 90 the court may not allow the exercise of the infant's right to
decline treatment. Further, since the underlying purpose of the rules is to
ensure that handicapped infants receive treatment,' 9' a court would find it
185. A "no code" order is placed in a terminally ill patient's chart directing a hospital and
its staff not to attempt to resuscitate the patient in the event of a cardiac or respiratory arrest.
Id. at 698, 434 N.E.2d at 602.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 699-700, 434 N.E.2d at 603. There were several factors which weighed against
treatment. First, there was no medical treatment available or soon to become available to treat
the infant's underlying heart defect. Death would occur within the first year of life. Second,
the measures used to resuscitate the infant would be highly invasive and cause the infant to
suffer substantial pain. Third, the measures would cause neurologic and liver damage. Finally,
the medical testimony concerning the infant's poor prognosis was unanimous. Id.
188. Id. at 703, 434 N.E.2d at 605.
189. Id. at 708, 434 N.E.2d at 608. The court identified six factors which made the cir-
cumstances suitable for the use of substituted judgment: (1) the child was a ward of the state;
(2) the child was not competent to make the decision; (3) the parents had abandoned the child;
(4) the child had an incurable condition and the prognosis for successful treatment was negative;
(5) the medical opinions as to the child's condition and future were unanimous; (6) attempts
to resuscitate the child would be painful and intrusive. As the court stated: "[T]his issue is
best resolved by requiring a judicial determination in accordance with the substituted judgment
doctrine enunciated in Saikewicz." Id.
190. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
191. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,846. As required by the
Administrative Procedure Act, the Secretary indicated that the purpose of the rule is to modify
existing regulations in order to "allow timely reporting of violations, expeditious investigation,
and immediate enforcement action when necessary" to protect an infant whose life is endangered
by discrimination in a program or actively receiving federal financial assistance. Id.
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difficult to endorse a substituted judgment that the infant would prefer non-
treatment. In effect, therefore, incorporation of the standards imposed by
the DHHS rules deprives the infant of the right to decline life-prolonging
treatment and denies parents the right to attempt to exercise that right for
the infant.
C. The Hofbauer Approach
1. Background
In re Hofbauer92 provides a third approach which may be used to analyze
parental decisions regarding medical care for their children. The Hofbauer
approach is appropriately employed in the limited situations where parents
and physicians agree on a course of treatment, but a third party challenges
the treatment as inappropriate.' 93 The Hofbauer case involved a neglect pro-
ceeding brought against the parents of a child with Hodgkins disease. 9 " The
narrow issue before the court was whether the parents of the child failed
to exercise minimum care by entrusting their child's care to a physician who
192. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
193. The Hofbauer approach is premised on the fact that the child is receiving treatment
from a licensed physician. Id. at 655, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940. Therefore,
the approach is inapplicable to cases in which parents refuse treatment, see supra notes 145-49,
or seek to provide unconventional treatment for their child which is not endorsed by any physi-
cian, see Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 748, 393 N.E.2d 836, 846 (1979) (on rehearing
of the Minor case, the Massachusetts Supreme Court distinguished Hofbauer, noting that, in
Hofbauer, the nutritional therapy was recommended by a physician, whereas in the Minor case,
the parents' request for nutritional therapy was unsupported by any physician).
194. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979). In 1977, seven-year-old
Joseph Hofbauer was diagnosed as having Hodgkin's disease. Id. at 652, 393 N.E.2d at 1011,
419 N.Y.S.2d at 938. Left untreated, Hodgkin's disease is almost always fatal. Id. The Hofbauers
rejected the physician's recommendation of conventional radiation and chemotherapy treatments
for Joseph and, instead, elected to take Joseph to a medical clinic in Jamaica for nutritional
therapy, an unconventional form of treatment which included the use of laetrile. Id. Upon
the Hofbauers' return, the state instituted neglect proceedings against the Hofbauers for failing
to choose conventional treatment for Joseph. Id. at 652, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
At the initial hearing, the court ordered that Joseph be placed in temporary custody of the
state and admitted to the hospital for conventional treatment. Id. One month later, Joseph's
parents petitioned for return of custody. Id. at 653, 393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at
938. The proceedings were suspended for six months because the Hofbauers entered into a
stipulation agreement which provided for a return of custody and authorized Joseph to come
under the care of a physician who advocated nutritional therapy. Id. The stipulation agreement
further provided that one other physician would consult on the case and both physicians would
submit medical reports to the court periodically. Id. The family court ultimately found that
Joseph was not a neglected child because his parents had made conscientious efforts to provide
him with a viable alternative to medical treatment administered by a physician, and therefore,
dismissed the petition. Id. at 654, 393 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939. The appellate
division and the Massachusetts Supreme Court unanimously affirmed. Id. For a discussion of
the Hofbauer decision, see Horowitz, supra note 141, at 271-75; Pendergast, The Judicial Dilemma
of Laetrile and a Possible Solution, 30 MERCER L. REV. 573, 580-81 (1979); Note, May Parents
Choose?, supra note 141, at 824-38.
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advocated treatment not widely embraced by the medical community.' The
parents had chosen an unconventional course of nutritional therapy rather
than the more conventional radiation and chemotherapy suggested by the
child's original physician.' 96 The court ultimately upheld the parents deci-
sion and allowed the unconventional treatment to continue.,9
The Hofbauer analysis represents a dramatic departure from the analysis
required under the best interest or substituted judgment approaches.' 9' Under
the Hofbauer approach, the issue in medical decision-making conflicts is
defined as "whether the parents have provided an acceptable course of
medical treatment in light of all the surrounding circumstances."' 99 To answer
that question, the court recommended a four-part inquiry."' 0 The court must
first determine whether the parents have sought accredited medical assistance;
second, whether the parents are aware of the seriousness of their child's
condition; third, whether the parents are aware of the possibility of cure
offered by the treatment chosen; and fourth, whether or not the treatment
recommended by their physician is rejected by all responsible medical
authority.2"'
Under the Hofbauer approach, parental rights and preferences are given
195. Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d at 654, 393 N.E.2d at 1013, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
196. Id. at 652, 393 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
197. Id. at 657, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42. The court based its holding
on several factors. First, review of testimony revealed that there was a sharp conflict in medical
opinion as to the efficacy of the mode of treatment being administered to Joseph. Id. at 653-54,
393 N.E.2d at 1012, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 939. Some physicians felt the mode of treatment ineffec-
tive, others felt the mode of treatment effective. Id. Second, the treating physician had con-
sulted with numerous other physicians regarding Joseph's care and did not rule out the possibility
of resorting to conventional therapy should nutritional therapy prove ineffective. Id. Third,
the parents had justifiable concerns about the deleterious effects of conventional therapy. Id.
Fourth, there was evidence that the nutritional therapy was controlling the disease and was
less toxic than conventional therapy. Id. Finally, the parents indicated they would resort to
conventional therapy, if necessary and recommended by the treating physician. Id.
198. The best interest approach focuses on arriving at a decision which is most compatible
with the best interests of the child. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text. The substituted
judgment approach focuses on arriving at a decision which the child would make if competent
to do so. See supra notes 155-89 and accompanying text. In contrast, the Hofbauer approach
focuses on whether or not the decision made by the parents will provide medically acceptable
treatment for the child.
199. 47 N.Y.S.2d 648, 656, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (1979). In the
court's opinion, the most significant factor in determining whether a child is being deprived
of adequate medical care, and is thus a neglected child, is whether the parents have attempted
to provide reasonable medical care for their child. Id.
200. Id. The court refused to cast the issue in terms of whether or not parents have made
a correct decision because, in the court's opinion, the present state of the practice of medicine
seldom permits the definitive conclusions which would necessarily follow the question of whether
the parents' decision was right or wrong. Id. In addition, the court rejected the idea of using
its judgment to determine the exact method or degree of medical care which should be pro-
vided to the child because such an analysis would be too subjective. Id. Instead, the court
viewed the issue as more properly cast in terms of whether the plan for treatment recommend-
ed by the physician and chosen by the parents is acceptable in light of the facts of the case. Id.
201. Id.
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significant deference." 2 This deference stems from the court's recognition
of parental rights and the normal pattern of decision-making." 3 Under the
Hofbauer analysis, the state should only be allowed to intervene when parents
have failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that acceptable medical treat-
ment is being provided to their child.2" '
2. Analysis of Proposed Rules and Hofbauer Approach
When the infant is classified as handicapped, the standards imposed by
the DHHS rules effectively preclude the court from using the Hofbauer
approach to analyze a decision to withhold treatment. If the infant is classified
as handicapped, the handicap becomes one of the surrounding circumstances
and triggers application of the rules. The rules operate to exclude parental
preferences and mandate treatment despite the fact that life-prolonging treat-
ment may offer little hope for an underlying cure. Accordingly, further
judicial inquiry into parental awareness of the infant's condition and pro-
gnosis and the acceptability of the physician's recommendations becomes ir-
relevant. Treatment must be ordered despite the fact that the parents' deci-
sion to withhold treatment is an informed decision based upon competent
medical advice. In effect, when the infant is classified as handicapped, the
DHHS rules would make a court's attempted use of the Hofbauer analysis
an exercise in futility.
D. Impact of Proposed Rules on Legal
Framework for Conflict
1. Resolution-Two Standards for Conflict Resolution
Application of the DHHS rules to the existing approaches for judicial
resolution of medical decision-making conflicts establishes a new standard
for conflict resolution. As a result, there are now two standards for the
judicial resolution of medical decision-making disputes. One standard,
applicable to non-handicapped infants, allows the use of the existing judicial
approaches which accord significant deference to parental preferences and
recognize the right of parents to act as primary decision-makers for their
202. Id. at 656, 393 N.E.2d at 1013, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940. Although the court recognized
that the state may intervene when a parental decision jeopardizes the child's health or welfare,
the court indicated that a reviewing court must accord significant deference to a parental choice
concerning the mode of medical treatment to be undertaken for the child and the physician
selected to administer the treatment. Id.
203. Id. at 655, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 940. The court stressed that parents,
in making the sensitive decision regarding their child's treatment, must rely on the recommen-
dations and competency of a licensed physician because "the physician is both trained and
in the best position to evaluate the medical needs of the child." Id.
204. Id. If the parents have undertaken reasonable efforts to ensure that acceptable medical
treatment is being provided to their child according to the Hofbauer standards, it appears that
a reviewing court would be reluctant to override a parents' decision or conclude as a matter
of law that the parents are neglectful.
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infants. The second standard, applicable to handicapped infants, alters these
existing conflict resolution approaches and effectively precludes the considera-
tion of parental preferences and the recognition of the parents' rights to
act as primary decision-makers for their infants. While a parental decision
that life-prolonging treatment would not be in their infant's best interest
is given significant deference under the traditional best interest analysis, the
DHHS rules would characterize such a decision as impermissibly subjective
and incompatible with the child's interest in treatment. Thus, the court is
denied the opportunity to give fair consideration to parental preferences under
the best interest approach. Under the substituted judgment approach, the
DHHS rules deprive the parents of the opportunity to exercise the infant's
right to decline life-prolonging treatment because the subjective analysis re-
quired to determine what the infant's decision would be is forbidden by the
rules. Finally, the DHHS rules make the Hofbauer approach virtually mean-
ingless because the rules reject the consideration of parental preference and
abrogate the parents' right to make a decision based upon competent medical
advice. In light of prevailing precedent, to the extent that the rules operate
to deny parental rights, the new standard created by the DHHS rules may
be properly characterized as an arbitrary and capricious denial of constitu-
tionally protected parental rights to control the care and upbringing of their
children.
2. Proposed Rules and Interpretational Problems
Because the proposed rules operate to deny parents the right to participate
in the decision-making process, the physician is left to determine the ap-
propriate course of treatment. A close examination of the rules, however,
reveals that they offer little guidance to the physician.
The distinction between when section 504205 applies and when it does not
apply is poorly conceptualized, creates confusion, and promotes misapplica-
tion of the rules. The confusion is most likely to occur in three situations:
1) when the infant's handicap is inextricably intertwined with the decision-
making process; 2) when a decision is made regarding extremely low birth-
weight infants; and 3) when the health care practitioner is trying to deter-
mine how broadly to read the proscription against clear violations.
The first situation is illustrated by the case of an infant suffering from
Trisomy 18, a genetic defect similar to Down's Syndrome (Trisomy 21).206
205. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides the legal authority for the DHHS
to intervene in the medical decision-making process through promulgation of the rules. Section
504 provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in
706(6) of this title shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
U.S.C. § 794 (1973 & Supp. V 1981).
206. See supra note 4.
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Trisomy 18 is invariably associated with profound mental retardation and
severe heart defects. Infants who have Trisomy 18 usually die within the first
year of life. There have been, however, rare occurences of long-term sur-
vivors. If the infant has a heart lesion that is potentially correctible with
surgery, should surgery be performed? If the decision is not to perform
surgery on a potentially correctible heart lesion, there could be a violation
of section 504 because surgery would have been performed "but for" the
handicap of Trisomy 18.207 On the other hand, the decision not to perform
surgery arguably would not violate section 504 because prolonging the in-
fant's life a few months longer, through surgery, could legitimately be con-
sidered to be of dubious medical benefit. 20 8
The second area of confusion concerns whether section 504 applies to the
treatment of an extremely low birth-weight infant.2"9 Provision of nourish-
ment and fluids to such an infant may properly be considered extraordinary
care. Extremely low birth-weight infants generally cannot receive nourish-
ment by mouth because their digestive tracts are too immature. 10 Conse-
quently, nourishment must be provided by intravenous therapy, which is
fraught with problems. Long-term intravenous therapy is required until the
infant's digestive tract has developed sufficiently for the infant to take
nourishment by mouth.2 ' Because the infant's veins are minute, it is dif-
ficult to insert and maintain intravenous lines. 212 The type of intravenous
solution required to provide adequate nutrition for growth is extremely com-
plex and may produce untoward and life-threatening side effects. 3 ' Thus,
207. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,852. The appendix states
that a clear violation of § 504 occurs when treatment is denied which would be provided "but
for" the infant's handicap. Id. at 30,852.
208. Section 504 would not apply to any case in which care or treatment is withheld on
the basis of legitimate medical judgment. That is, treatment of dubious medical benefit, futile
acts or therapy, or treatment which merely prolongs the process of dying for an infant born
terminally ill, would not be required. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18,
at 30,852.
209. See G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 230-61. Extremely low birthweight infants are born
between 23 and 26 weeks of pregnancy, and weigh between 500 grams (1 lb. 2 oz.) and 750
grams (I lb. 10 oz.). In 1975, only 807o of these infants survived. Id. at 240-41. As a result
of advances in neonatal care, however, the survival rate for infants at the higher end of the
weight spectrum is improving, although treatment often causes significant mental, motor, visual
and lung impairments. Id. at 240.
210. Id. at 243. The intestinal tract of an infant is incapable of accepting and absorbing
an adequate milk intake until the infant reaches 32 weeks of gestation.
211. Id. at 243. Intravenous therapy may be necessary for up to 60 days or more. Id.
212. Id. at 64-65. Intravenous lines may be inserted in peripheral or central veins. Peripheral
veins are those just under the skin. Central veins, such as the jugular vein, are deep and generally
much larger than peripheral veins. Peripheral veins in these infants are minute and fragile thereby
making it difficult to maintain intravenous feedings. Use of central veins is limited because
of the danger of infection. Id.
213. Id. at 65. The type of solution used is called hyperalimentation and includes amino
acids to promote growth, glucose and lipid (fat) to meet caloric expenditures, and added vitamins
and minerals. The composition of the fluid is determined by the infant's needs which are assessed
almost daily through biochemical blood and urine analysis. Hyperalimentation may cause life-
threatening infections. This occurs either because the solution itself provides a medium in which
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medical decisions regarding care of such an infant must encompass the
feasibility of providing nourishment. If the practitioner's decision not to in-
stitute intravenous fluid therapy on an extremely low birth-weight infant,
whose survival was improbable despite attempts at nourishment, was based
on the exercise of reasonable medical judgment, section 504 might not be
violated.21 4 Yet, since a decision to withhold nourishment is not an option
for medical judgment under the DHHS rules, a strong argument can be made
that such a decision would be a violation of section 504.215
The third area of confusion surrounding the application of section 504
surfaces when the practitioner attempts to determine how broadly to read
the proscriptions against certain decisions. The appendix to the DHHS rules
indicates that it would be a clear violation of section 504 not to perform
surgery to correct an intestinal atresia, an esophageal atresia, or an operable
heart lesion on an infant with Down's Syndrome unless an additional com-
plication medically warrants a decision not to operate.2 16 It is unclear,
however, whether the rules require surgery to be performed if the infant
has all three conditions and surgery is unlikely to succeed. A broad reading
of the language in the example suggests that surgery must be performed;
a narrow reading suggests surgery may not be required.
Furthermore, the rules are replete with vague terminology and, in most
instances, the determination of whether or not section 504 applies depends
upon how the terminology is defined. For example, discriminatory denial
of food and customary medical care constitutes a violation of section 504,
but there is no indication of what standard of customary medical care is
to be employed.2 1 7 Regardless of which standard is employed, in view of
the rapid advances in neonatal care, customary care is an amorphous con-
cept difficult to apply with certainty." '1 In light of the ambiguities inherent
in the rules, it is difficult for the sophisticated health care practitioner to
determine when a section 504 violation will occur.
Finally, enforcement procedures for section 504 are inappropriate. Notice
and complaint procedures were apparently selected as a means of enforcing
bacteria and yeast can grow easily or because the hypertonicity of the solution erodes a peripheral
vein causing an infiltration of the solution into subcutaneous tissue, burning the tissue and
providing a source of infection. Id. at 65, 243-45.
214. Health Care for Handicapped Infants, supra note 18, at 30,852. Decisions to withhold
extraordinary care from these infants would not implicate § 504 if the decision is based on
"reasonable medical judgment concerning the improbability of success in a course of treat-
ment, or risks and potential harm in the course of treatment."
215. Id. "At the same time, the basic provision of nourishment, fluids and routine nursing
care is a fundamental matter of human dignity, not an option for medical judgment." Id.
216. Id. For a discussion of the conditions encompassed in the example, see supra note 4.
217. For example, does the local community standard of customary medical care apply or
does the national medical center standard of customary medical care apply? Application of
community standards to community hospitals and national standards to medical centers would
lead to uneven and disparate application of § 504.
218. Other terms requiring further definition to be meaningful include "food," "extraordinary
medical care," and "routine nursing care."
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section 504 because of the success of those procedures in the civil rights
context. There are not enough similarities between the two contexts, however,
to justify such a conclusion. For example, in the health care context an in-
vestigation would take place in an intensive care setting rather than in a
hearing. The time for investigation would be measured by minutes and hours
rather than weeks or months. Further, the level of expertise required of the
investigator would be extremely high because medical decisions rest on highly
technical and complex considerations rather than matters of general
knowledge. Finally, such an investigation would impinge upon sensitive rela-
tionships between physicians and agonized parents who are under stress-a
type of stress that does not exist in the civil rights context. Investigations
could require detailed explanation of the decision-maker's rationale, con-
sume hours of staff time, and disrupt patient care. DHHS investigations




Determining when and under what circumstances treatment may be withheld
from a seriously ill infant presents a complex and agonizing dilemma for
those involved in the decision-making process. In addition, as medical science
and technology create new treatment possibilities, the determination becomes
even more complex. At the threshold of each new development, it is often
difficult to determine whether treatment will save the infant's life or be merely
painfully life-prolonging. Those involved in the decision-making process can
219. In March 1983, the DHHS conducted an investigation into the care being delivered
to conjoined (Siamese) twins, having two heads and one trunk. The investigation was triggered
by an unidentified caller from another town who had read of the twins' birth and, suspecting
they might be denied food or medical care, called the hotline. In addition to dealing with
trauma caused by the birth of the infants, the parents were forced to deal with the investigators
and with the local newspaper accounts of the investigation. On April 1, based on newspaper
reports and belief that the hospital was intentionally harming children, one family removed
its seriously ill child from the hospital.
The DHHS conducted a broader investigation at Vanderbilt University Hospital because the
call which triggered the investigation charged that 10 named children at the hopsital were not
being provided proper treatment or food. The investigators met with the children's attending
physician, the chief pediatric resident, and an associate director of nursing from 9:30 to 11:45
p.m., during which time the care given each child was discussed. Following the meeting, the
investigators and physicians made rounds to visit each child. The next day, the investigators
examined medical records and interviewed the nursing staff, hospital administrative staff, and
the chief resident from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. The impact of the investigation on the hospital
and the care provided was significant. Because the investigators had the infants' medical charts,
one infant could not be discharged from an intensive care unit, transfer of children from the
pediatric intensive care unit to surgery was delayed, and laboratory tests had to be reordered.
Further, the chief of pediatrics, a pediatric resident, six nurses, and the associate nursing direc-
tor spent a total of 44 hours, which would have been spent delivering patient care, with the
investigators. Both investigations resulted in findings that the care the children were receiving
was "exemplary." Letter from James Stain, M.D., to Members of the American Academy
of Pediatrics (June 29, 1983) (discussing the requirements of the proposed rules).
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only rely on their best judgment, in light of prevailing knowledge, to deter-
mine whether treatment is appropriate.
Because of the inherent complexity of the situation, regulation of the
decision-making process as suggested by the DHHS rules is difficult and
inappropriate. The goal of ensuring that non-discriminatory treatment is pro-
vided to all handicapped infants is laudatory. Nevertheless, an artificial
distinction between handicapped and non-handicapped infants promotes
uncertainty and trammels the rights of those involved. Moreover, such a
narrow focus does little to resolve the issue underlying all decisions regard-
ing treatment of seriously ill infants. That underlying issue is the procedural
safeguards which are necessary to ensure that the bedside decision is well-
informed and affords the infant the opportunity to receive care most
appropriate to meet its special needs.
A reasonable alternative to the approach suggested by the DHHS should
eliminate the distinction between handicapped and non-handicapped infants,
provide procedures which would ensure that parents are provided with
accurate information regarding treatment options, allow for review of deci-
sions to withhold treatment when appropriate, and protect the interests of
all involved. Professional medical associations and health care institutions
should develop procedures to be used in situations when a decision to
withhold treatment is contemplated.22 Specifically, procedures should be
developed to (1) provide a mechanism to ensure that decisions are made
based upon complete and current information as to the type of treatment
available for the infant's condition, and (2) provide mechanisms for review
of decisions to withhold treatment. 22'
In order to ensure that decisions are made based upon complete and cur-
rent information, when a pediatrician contemplates withholding treatment
from a seriously ill infant, the procedure should require consultation be-
tween the pediatrician and a physician who specializes in the care of critical-
ly ill infants. If a specialist is on staff at the hospital, consultation is easily
accessible. If no specialist serves on the staff, the procedure would require
telephone consultation with a neonatologist. 22
In addition to requiring consultation, the procedures should provide a
review of decisions to withhold treatment. The most appropriate body to
220. This alternative is also recommended by the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. See President's Com-
mission, supra note 2, at 227; see also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1975) (recom-
mending the use of ethics committees to review decisions to withhold treatment), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976). But see Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (decisions to withhold treatment are more properly reviewed
by judiciary).
221. See President's Commission, supra note 2, at 227.
222. Because most community hospital pediatricians currently transfer critically ill infants
to tertiary care facilitiies for care, telephone consultation with neonatologists is not an uncom-
mon practice. Consequently, telephone consultation could provide an easily accessible and realistic
approach to ensuring that the pediatrician presents current information to the parents. See
G. AVERY, supra note 1, at 40.
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conduct such a review would be that of the Internal Review Board. The
Board, composed of representatives from various health care disciplines,
would review decisions to withhold life-prolonging treatment. The type of
review required would vary with the facts of the particular case. At the very
least, consultation should be required to confirm a diagnosis that the in-
fant's condition is obviously fatal. In cases where the prognosis is less cer-
tain, the board would review the entire decision-making process. The review
would verify that the decision was based upon current information and con-
firm the propriety of the decision. Further, if the board viewed the decision
as inappropriate, the board would have the authority to refer the case to
child-protective services or the court for timely dispute resolution. Because
there would no longer be a distinction made between handicapped and non-
handicapped infants, the court would be free to use existing legal analyses
for conflict resolution. Each analysis provides maximum protection for the
infant, yet preserves the parents' rights to participate in the medical decision-
making process.
The proposed alternative offers several advantages over the DHHS
approach. The alternative promotes informed decision-making and allows
parents to explore all available options for treatment. Review of the deci-
sion is readily accessible to those involved and provides minimal disruption
of patient care.223 Use of the review board provides protective screening to
ensure that decisions are based upon worthy motives." ' Conflict resolution
relies on the prevailing mechanisms for judicial review. Finally, the proposed
alternative provides maximum protection for the infant while preserving the
parents' rights to participate in the decision-making process.225
VI. CONCLUSION
The DHHS rules were drafted in response to a specific instance of the
withholding of treatment from an infant. Understandably, sensationalized
accounts of this episode provoked public outrage. The rules were enacted
in an effort to prevent discrimination and the withholding of treatment merely
on the basis of an infant's handicap. Although this objective is praiseworthy,
223. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
224. Id.
225. A federal district court in New York recently rejected the DHHS request for access
to hospital records concerning "Baby Jane Doe." Chicago Tribune, Nov. 19, 1983, at 8, col.
4. The infant had been born with meninomyelocle, hydrocephaly, and microcephaly. The parents
and physicians agreed that corrective surgery would be withheld. The physicians predicted that
without surgery the infant would live for six weeks to two years. With surgery, the infant
would live into her twenties, however, she would be retarded, epileptic, paralyzed, bedridden
and doomed to constant pain. Complex Case of Baby Jane Doe, New York Times, Oct. 23,
1983, § 4, at E6, col. 2. An attorney from Vermont heard of the decision and petitioned the
New York courts to override the parents' decision. The New York Superior Court dismissed
the suit and upheld the parents' decision. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607
(E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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the rules are poorly conceptualized. First, the rules effectively eliminate
parents' rights to participate in the decision-making process. Second, the
vague and confusing terms provide little guidance to the physician seeking
to counsel the parents. Finally, the rules do little to assist those seeking well-
reasoned approaches to the question of when treatment should be withheld.
The proper resolution of this issue, how decisions to withhold treatment
from infants should be made, is a tremendous challenge to all those cur-
rently involved in the decision-making process. This challenge has not been
met by the proposed rules. Instead, the rules only promote uncertainty.
Although this Comment suggests an alternative to the DHHS rules, it is
imperative that the DHHS re-examine its position and allow for the develop-
ment of well-reasoned approaches to the problem. Perpetuating the current
ill-conceived and ill-advised course of action will only generate confusion
in an already complex area of health care.*
Denice Krez
*Subsequent to the submission of this Comment for publication, the DHHS published Final
Rules in the Federal Register. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap: Procedures and
Guidelines Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 49 Fed. Reg. 1622 (1984) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) (proposed Jan. 12, 1984). The DHHS indicated that the
proposed rules were significantly modified in response to the 16,739 comments received during
the notice and comment period. Id. at 1623.
Close examination of the final rules reveals, however, that the DHHS effectively made only
four substantive modifications to the proposed rules. Id. at 1651-54. The first modification
is that the final rules encourage, but do not require, recipient health care providers to establish
Infant Care Review Committees. Id. at 1651. The DHHS recommends that these review com-
mittees assist health care providers in developing standards, policies, and procedures for pro-
viding care to handicapped infants and make decisions concerning treatment in specific cases.
Id. The supplementary information section, however, indicates that the committees may not
be given an exclusive role in reviewing decisions to withhold treatment from infants and are
not a substitute for mechanisms to enforce § 504. Id. at 1624. Thus, the final rules continue
the enforcement mechanisms of the proposed rules. Specifically, the DHHS's assertion of the
authority for access to hospital records and ability to conduct on-site investigations in the health
care setting remain in effect. In addition, health care providers continue to have an affirmative
duty to take necessary steps to ensure compliance with the rules. Id. at 1654.
The second modification of the final rules continues the notice requirement of the proposed
rules, but offers two alternative notices and changes the requirement for location, size and
wording of the notice. If the care provider has policies and procedures concerning both
withholding treatment and review of decisions to withhold treatment from handicapped in-
fants, Notice A may be posted. Id. at 1651. On the other hand, if the hospital has no such
procedures, the hospital must post Notice B. With the exception of the reference to hospital
policies in Notice A, both notices are similar. Further, the final rules require only that the
notice be posted in locations where members of the health care team would see the notice
and need not be posted where parents of infant patients would see the notice. Id. In contrast,
the proposed rules required that the notice be posted in each nurses' station responsible for
the care of infants.
The size of the notice has been decreased from 8 by I inches to 5 by 7 inches. In addi-
tion, the wording of the notice has been revised in order to describe the protection of the
law given to handicapped infants in simple terms and convey information in a less negative
manner than the wording of the notice in the proposed rules. Id. at 1626. To illustrate, the
542 DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 33:495
notice required in the final rules carries the heading "PRINCIPLES OF TREATMENT OF
DISABLED INFANTS" rather than the heading "DISCRIMINATORY FAILURE TO FEED
AND CARE FOR HANDICAPPED INFANTS IN THIS FACILITY IS PROHIBITED BY
LAW." Id. The content of the notice in the final rules is also meant to reflect deference to
medical judgments. Id. The notice mandated by the final rules states that "nourishment and
medically beneficial treatment (as determined with respect for reasonable medical judgments)
should not be withheld from handicapped infants solely on the basis of the present or an-
ticipated medical or physical impairments." Id. at 1651. This language was not present in the
notice required by the proposed rules. In addition, reference to the fact that failure to feed
or care for infants may be violative of state criminal and civil laws has been deleted from
the notice requirements. Id. Despite these changes, however, the major substantive element
of the notice requirement of the proposed rules remains in effect. Specifically, the final rules
mandate that the notice contain hotline numbers for reporting suspected cases of noncompliance
to designated hospital officials, child protective services, or the DHHS. Id.
The third and most important modification of the proposed rules is contained in the appen-
dix of the final rules. Id. at 1653-54. In this section, the DHHS set forth illustrative inter-
pretative guidelines for applying the law relating to health care for handicapped infants. Id.
at 1653. The guidelines appear to remedy some of the interpretative difficulties encountered
with the proposed rules. The DHHS indicates that futile treatment, treatment which may cause
harm to the infant, or treatment with a low probability of success may be withheld without
violating § 504 so long as the decision to withhold treatment is based upon reasonable medical
judgments and not solely on the. infant's handicap. Id. at 1653-54. At the same time, however,
the guidelines appear to supply an extremely broad definition of handicap which makes § 504
applicable to any infant who has a present or anticipated physical or mental impairment. This
broad definition is coupled with the affirmative duty placed on health care providers to take
all necessary steps to ensure compliance with the rules. These modifications make virtually
all decisions to withhold treatment from infants subject to the mandate of § 504.
The most significant failing of the guidelines, however, is that they do not address whether
or not decisions to withhold treatment will survive § 504 scrutiny in cases where the infant's
present or anticipated physical or mental impairment is inextricably intertwined in the decision-
making process. Thus, the impact of these guidelines is that the final rules will have precisely
the same effect on decision-making indicated in the Comment.
The fourth and final modification concerns the new guidelines for the DHHS investiga-
tions set forth in the appendix to the final rules. Id. at 1654. Pursuant to the guidelines, upon
receipt of a complaint alleging non-compliance with § 504, the DHHS officials will immediate-
ly conduct a preliminary inquiry into the matter. Id. The DHHS will first initiate telephone contact
with hospital officials to obtain information concerning the condition of the infant and the
treatment being offered. Id. If the hospital has an Infant Care Review Committee, the DHHS
will also obtain information from the committee. Id. On the basis of the information obtained,
the DHHS will determine whether or not on-site investigation is necessary. Id. Any doubts
concerning compliance will be resolved by on-site investigation. Id. Unless impracticable, hospital
personnel will be contacted prior to the on-site investigation. Id. The DHHS will make every
effort to minimize disruption of patient care and coordinate its activities with those of state
child protective service agencies. Id. In addition, the DHHS will obtain the assistance of qualified
medical consultants to aid in evaluating medical records. When possible, the consultant will
be a specialist with respect to the condition of the infant who is the subject of the investigation
or inquiry. Id. The DHHS will inform the hospital of the results of the investigation and whether
the matter will be referred to the Department of Justice following the investigation. Id. To
the extent permitted by law, all information obtained will be confidential. Finally, the guidelines
indicate that as a matter of policy, the DHHS will not make comments to the public or media
regarding the substance of preliminary inquiries or investigations. Although these guidelines
provide articulated procedural safeguards for parents and health care providers not present
in the proposed ruled, the DHHS's assertion of the underlying right of access to conduct in-
vestigations has been effectively adopted without modification from the proposed rules.
Six weeks after publication of the final rules, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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denied the DHHS the right of access to the medical records of a severely deformed newborn
infant. United States v. University Hosp., State Univ. of New York at Stony Brook, 729
F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984). The infant, identified only as Baby Jane Doe, was born on October
11, 1983. Id. at 146. She had multiple birth defects, the most serious of which were myelomen-
ingocele, microcephaly, and hydrocephalus. Id. As a result of the myelomeningocele, the baby
had impaired rectal, bladder, leg, and sensory functions. Because of the microcephaly and
hydrocephalus, she was also considered to be "at exteremly high risk" for severe mental retar-
dation. Id. In addition, she had a malformed brain stem, upper extremity spasticity, and an
inability to close her eyes or make full sucking motions. Id. Physicians presented Baby Doe's
parents with two treatment options. One option consisted of surgical treatment which would
prolong the infant's life, but would not improve her handicapping conditions. Id. After careful
consideration of the options, the Does' chose the conservative medical treatment for their in-
fant. Id.
On October 16, 1983, a Vermont attorney, unrelated to the Does, initiated proceedings in
the New York State Supreme Court seeking appointment of a guardian ad litem for the infant
and an order directing that surgery be performed on the infant. Id. The court ordered surgery,
however, one day later the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed the
decision and dismissed the proceeding. Id. at 147. The court determined "that the concededly
concerned and loving parents [had] made an informed, intelligent, and reasonable determina-
tion based upon and supported by responsible medical authority." Id. Twelve days later, the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but relied on different grounds to support
the decision. Id. Specifically, the court determined that because the Vermont attorney lacked
any relationship to the parties and because the state agency responsible for such proceedings
was not involved, there was "no precedent or authority" for the proceeding. Id.
While the state court proceedings were pending, the DHHS received a complaint that Baby
Jane Doe was being discriminatorily denied medically indicated treatment because of her
handicaps. The DHHS initially referred the complaint to the New York State Ch'ild Protection
Services. Following an investigation, the state agency concluded that there was no ground for
state intervention. Id. In the interim, the Surgeon General of the United States reviewed the
record of the state court proceedings which included copies of the medical records of the first
eight days of Baby Doe's life. Id. The DHHS subsequently requested that University Hospital
make all of Baby Doe's medical records available for inspection by the DHHS officials. Id.
Due to the hospital's repeated refusals to comply with the DHHS's request for the infant's
medical records, the DHHS brought an action alleging that the hospital violated § 504 and
45 C.F.R. § 80.6(c) by denying the DHHS access to information concerning Baby Doe. Id.
at 148. The district court concluded that the decision not to perform surgery was the result
of the Does' reasonable refusal of surgery and not because of any discrimination by the hospital.
Id. at 148-49. As such, the court could not find the hospital liable for any violation of the
Rehabilitation Act. Id.
The court of appeals affirmed the decision but found that neither the legislative history and
case law interpreting § 504 nor the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act would support the DHHS's
assertion of authority to obtain access to the infant's medical records. Id. at 153-59. Further,
in the court's opinion, absent any clear congressional directive for federal intervention in the
medical decision making process, "it would be an unwarranted exercise of judicial power to
approve the type of investigaton that has precipitated this lawsuit." Id. at 159. In view of
this decision, the continuing validity of the DIHHS's rules is questionable.

